Manipulation through bribes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schummer, J
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2618
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 180-198
• 关键词: strategy-proof; bribe; manipulation; collusion

摘要

We consider allocation rules that choose outcomes and transfers, based on agents' reported valuations of the outcomes. A bribing situation exists when one agent could pay another to misreport his valuations, resulting in a net gain to both. A bribe-proof rule eliminates such opportunities. We show that under a bribe-proof rule, each agent's payoff is a continuous function of other agents' reported valuations. Furthermore, on connected domains, if the set of outcomes is finite or the domain is smoothly connected, each agent's payoff is a constant function of other agents' reports. Finally, under a domain-richness condition, a bribe-proof rule must be constant. The results apply to a broad class of economies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, D70. (C) 2000 Academic Press.