On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Kessler, AS
署名单位：
University of Bonn
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2617
发表日期：
2000
页码：
280-291
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies a stylized three-layer agency framework in which a principal hires a supervisor to monitor an agent's productive effort. It is demonstrated that the possibility of collusion imposes no additional cost on the principal if the supervisor's report is hard information, i.e., monitoring evidence call only be concealed and not forged. This result holds irrespective of the nature of the penalty that can be imposed on the agent. The findings suggest that it is strictly better for the principal to monitor the agent's action rather than to audit the agent's private information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, L23. (C) 2000 Academic Press.