Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Campbell, CM; Levin, D
署名单位：
Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2600
发表日期：
2000
页码：
106-120
关键词：
摘要：
In existing models of first-price common-value auctions, heterogeneous bidder information characterized by a well-informed insider is detrimental to the seller's revenue. We show that this is not a general principle. The linkage effect of increased information identified by Milgrom and Weber has force in our model of heterogeneous bidders, and dominates any adverse effects of an insider on revenues. In addition, a bidder with garbled information can profit in a first-price auction if his information is private, and an inside bidder may prefer to have less information about the outside bidder's signal. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, D82. 2000 Academic Press.