Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Aiyagari, SR; Williamson, SD
署名单位：
University of Rochester; University of Iowa
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2620
发表日期：
2000
页码：
248-279
关键词：
摘要：
We construct a model with private information in which consumers write dynamic contracts with financial intermediaries. A role for money arises due to random limited participation of consumers in the financial market. Without defection constraints, a Friedman rule is optimal, the mean and variability of wealth tend to fall with inflation in the steady state, and the welfare effects of inflation are very small. With defection constraints, the effects of inflation on the distribution of welfare and consumption are large, but the effect on average welfare is still small. The relaxation of defection constraints resulting from higher inflation can cause a substantial increase in the real interest rate. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D8, E4, G2. (C) 2000 Academic Press.