The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Koçkesen, L; Ok, EA; Sethi, R
署名单位：
Columbia University; New York University; Columbia University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2587
发表日期：
2000
页码：
274-299
关键词：
摘要：
We study certain classes of supermodular and submodular games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but in which not all players seek to maximize their material payoffs. Specifically, a subset of players have negatively interdependent preferences and care not about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others. We identify sufficient conditions under which members of the latter group have a strategic advantage in the following sense: at all intragroup symmetric equilibria of the game, they earn strictly higher material payoffs than do players who seek to maximize their material payoffs. The conditions are satisfied by number of games of economic importance. We discuss the implications of these findings for the evolutionary theory of preference formation and the theory of strategic delegation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D62. (C) 2000 Academic Press.