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作者：Zheng, BH
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Denver
摘要：This paper introduces a measure of distribution-sensitivity, which is similar to Arrow-Pratt's measure of risk clr aversion. for a poverty index. The measure also gauges poverty aversion and has a clear and straightforward interpretation. Using this measure. We can define various classes or minimum distribution-sensitive poverty indices. We show that the ordering condition for such a class of poverty indices is simply a generalized (poverty) deprivation profile dominance Properties and implica...
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作者：Casadesus-Masanell, R; Klibanoff, P; Ozdenoren, E
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper provides an axiomatic foundation For a maxmin expected utility over a set of priors (MMEU) decision rule in an environment where the elements of choice are Savage acts. This characterization complements the original axiomatization of MMEU developed in a lottery-acts (or Anscombe-Aumann) framework by I. Gilboa and D. Schmeidler (1989 J, Math. Econ. 18, 141-153). MMEU preferences are of interest primarily because they provide a natural and tractable way of modeling decision makers who...
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作者：Reynolds, SS; Wilson, BJ
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Arizona
摘要：We analyze investment and pricing incentives in a symmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth framework with uncertain demand. Firms choose production capacities before observing demand. Prices are chosen Lifter demand is observed. if the extent of demand variation exceeds a threshold level then a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies for capacities does not exist. A smaller firm has no incentive (ex ante) to expand its capacity because capacity expansion would reduce its expected revenue in the event tha...
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作者：Polemarchakis, HM; Seccia, G
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Brunel University
摘要：In an example, monetary policy can determine the information revealed by prices, and thus it can be: effective. Monetary policy that varies only with public information can guarantee the full revelation of information at equilibrium. which is optimal. Full indexation need not attain full revelation and, as a consequence. need not implement an optimal allocation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D82. E52. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Fernandes, A; Phelan, C
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：We present general recursive methods to handle environments where privately observed variables are linked over time. We show that incentive compatible contracts are implemented recursively with a threat keeping constraint in addition to the usual temporary incentive compatibility and promise keeping conditions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D30, D31, D80, D82. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Shinkai, T
摘要：I consider a three-player Stackelberg. game where each player has its private signal concerning stochastic demand. I show that at a perfectly revealing equilibrium, the second mover earns the lowest and the third mover the highest expected profit of the three. I characterize this result by the strategic substitutes or complements relationships among three firms at the equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82, and L13. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Ghiglino, C; Tvede, M
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; University of Copenhagen
摘要：In the present paper general stationary overlapping generations economies with many commodities in every period and many different consumers in every generation are considered. A government maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function, which is the sum of weighted averages of utilities for generations, through fiscal policy, i.e., monetary transfers and taxes. Situations both with and without time discounting are considered. It is shown that if the discount factor is sufficiently close to o...
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作者：Citanna, A; Villanacci, A
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Florence
摘要：We compare rational expectations equilibria with different degrees of information revelation through prices. These equilibria arise in a two-period exchange economy with finitely many states and signals, multiple commodities and incomplete financial markets for nominal assets. We show that there are always equilibria where information is redundant in the sense of being of no value to the uninformed traders. We give conditions under which for a generic set of economies, parametrized by endowmen...
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作者：Serrano, R; Volij, O
作者单位：Brown University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Consider an exchange economy where agents are arbitragers, in that they try to upset allocations imagining plausible beneficial trades. With an introspective algorithm, each agent constructs an interactive choice set (ICS), i.e., a set of bundles that he considers achievable through a sequence of plausible trades with other agents. We show that Walrasian allocations can he characterized as those where each agent chooses optimally from his ICS, which is always contained in a budget set (with di...
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作者：Gul, F; Stacchetti, E
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study economies (with indivisibilities) that satisfy the gross substitutes (GS) condition. We define an excess demand set with the property that increasing the prices of all goods in excess demand eventually leads to the smallest Walrasian prices. This procedure is a generalization of the auction studied by G, Demange, D. Gale and M. J. Sotomayor, Polit, Econ, 94 (1986), 863-872. In our auction, truthful revelation of demand is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if the smallest Walrasian prices...
