-
作者：Chiappori, P. A.; Ekeland, I.
作者单位：Columbia University; University of British Columbia
摘要：We study the demand function of a group of S members facing a global budget constraint. Any vector belonging to the budget set can be consumed within the group, with no restriction on the form of individual preferences, the nature of individual consumptions or the form of the decision process beyond efficiency. Moreover, only the group aggregate behavior, summarized by its demand function, is observable. We provide necessary and (locally) sufficient restrictions that fully characterize the gro...
-
作者：Chade, Hector
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper explores matching with both search and information frictions. Specifically. everyone observes only a noisy signal of the true type of any potential mate. In this context. matching decisions must incorporate not only information about a partner's attribute conveyed by the noisy signal. but also-as in the winner's curse in auction theory-information about a partner's type contained in his or her acceptance decision. We show that there exists an equilibrium exhibiting a stochastic posi...
-
作者：Olszewski, Wojciech
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I formalize the notion of equilibrium language, define the relation of having a richer language, and show the existence of equilibria with maximally rich language. I also study the stability of equilibria with respect to inflows of messages that can enrich their language, and provide examples of implausible cheap-talk equilibria, not refined away by the existing refinements, which can be refined away on the grounds of stability properties. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Busetto, Francesca; Codognato, Giulio
作者单位：University of Udine
摘要：Following Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976], we study the problem of the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which each trading post is either active or legitimately inactive, and we call it a Shapley NE. We consider an example of an exchange economy, borrowed from Cordella and Gabszewicz [Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 162-169], which satisfies the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik [J. Econ. Theory 17 (1978) 1-20], and we show that the t...
-
作者：Han, Seungjin
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：This paper studies bilateral contracting where multiple principals negotiate contracts with multiple agents independently. It is shown that pure-strategy equilibrium allocations relative to any ad hoc set of feasible mechanisms are supported by pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria relative to the set of menus. This paper also shows that all equilibrium allocations to any ad hoc set of feasible mechanisms are supported by correlated equilibria relative to the set of menus, where a state is...
-
作者：Caplin, Andrew; Leahy, John
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Durable goods are an important component of the business cycle. Equilibrium models of durable goods markets are made difficult by the lumpy nature of individual purchases. We show that a straightforward approximation of the distribution of durable goods holdings gives rise to a tractable equilibrium model. We analyze the case of competition as well as that of a monopoly producer. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Battaglini, Marco
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：Consider Holmstrom's moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has an a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output is in-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation generically exists if and only if Sigma(n)(i=1)a(i)/(n - 1) < m. Moreover, under a weak additional condition, the equilibrium implemented by this mechanism is unique in the class of pure strategy Coalition-Proof eq...
-
作者：Nisan, Noam; Segal, Ilya
作者单位：Stanford University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We show that any communication finding a value-maximizing allocation in a private-information economy must also discover supporting prices (in general personalized and nonlinear). In particular, to allocate L indivisible items between two agents, a price must be revealed for each of the 2(L) - 1 bundles. We prove that all monotonic prices for an agent must be used, hence exponential communication in L is needed. Furthermore, exponential communication is needed just to ensure a higher share of ...
-
作者：Carlstrom, Charles T.; Fuerst, Timothy S.; Ghironi, Fabio
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University System of Ohio; Bowling Green State University; Boston College
摘要：What inflation rate should the central bank target? We address determinacy issues related to this question in a two-sector model in which prices can differ in equilibrium. We assume that the degree of nominal price stickiness can vary across the sectors and that labor is immobile. The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that a modified Taylor Principle holds in this environment. If the central bank elects to target sector one, and if it responds with a coefficient greater than unity t...
-
作者：Kajii, Atsushi; Ui, Takashi
作者单位：Kyoto University; Yokohama National University
摘要：This paper considers a two-agent model of trade with multiple priors. Firstly, we characterize the existence of an agreeable bet on some event in terms of the set of priors. It is then shown that the existence of an agreeable bet on some event is a strictly stronger condition than the existence of an agreeable trade, whereas the two conditions are equivalent in the standard Bayesian framework. Secondly, we show that the two conditions are equivalent when the set of priors is the core of a conv...
