Agreeable bets with multiple priors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kajii, Atsushi; Ui, Takashi
• 署名单位: Kyoto University; Yokohama National University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.004
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 299-305
• 关键词: Multiple priors; convex capacity; agreeing and disagreeing; Choquet integral

摘要

This paper considers a two-agent model of trade with multiple priors. Firstly, we characterize the existence of an agreeable bet on some event in terms of the set of priors. It is then shown that the existence of an agreeable bet on some event is a strictly stronger condition than the existence of an agreeable trade, whereas the two conditions are equivalent in the standard Bayesian framework. Secondly, we show that the two conditions are equivalent when the set of priors is the core of a convex capacity. These results are also related to the no trade theorems under asymmetric information. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.