Very Nice trivial equilibria in strategic market games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Busetto, Francesca; Codognato, Giulio
• 署名单位: University of Udine
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.005
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 295-301
• 关键词: strategic market games; trivial equilibria

摘要

Following Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976], we study the problem of the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which each trading post is either active or legitimately inactive, and we call it a Shapley NE. We consider an example of an exchange economy, borrowed from Cordella and Gabszewicz [Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 162-169], which satisfies the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik [J. Econ. Theory 17 (1978) 1-20], and we show that the trivial equilibrium, the unique NE of the associated strategic market game, is not very nice, in the sense that it is not legitimately trivial. This result has the more general implication that, under the Dubey and Shubik's assumptions, a Shapley NE may fail to exist. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.