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作者：Nakajima, T
作者单位：Kyoto University
摘要：Using an efficiency-wage model, we examine the relationship between indeterminacy and unemployment insurance. It is shown that the less unemployment insurance is, the more likely equilibrium is to be indeterminate. Equilibrium can be indeterminate even without externalities or increasing returns, which makes a sharp contrast to the recent literature on indeterminacy. Our result is based on the fact that the no-shirking condition with marginal utility of wealth kept constant is downward sloping...
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作者：Sleet, C; Yeltekin, E
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Iowa
摘要：Empirical analyses of labor tax and public debt processes provide prima facie evidence for imperfect government insurance. This paper considers a model in which the government's inability to commit to future policies or to report truthfully its spending needs renders government debt markets endogenously incomplete. A method for solving for optimal fiscal policy under these constraints is developed. Such policy is found to be intermediate between that implied by the complete insurance (Ramsey) ...
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作者：Banks, JS; Duggan, J; Le Breton, M
作者单位：University of Rochester; California Institute of Technology; University of Rochester; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：This paper extends the theory of the core, the uncovered set, and the related undomiated set to a general set of alternatives and an arbitrary measure space of voters. We investigate the properties of social preferences generated by simple games; we extend results on generic emptiness of the core; we prove the general nonemptiness of the uncovered and undominated sets; and we prove the upper hemicontinuity of these correspondences when the voters' preferences are such that the core is nonempty...
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C.
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Bonn
摘要：The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non-trivial forms of unawareness (Modica and Rustichini (Theory Decision 37 (1994) 107-124); Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (Econometrica 66 (1998) 159-173)). We introduce a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge as well as all the desiderata on unawareness proposed this far in the literature. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights r...
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作者：Peters, Michael; Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：Duke University; University of British Columbia
摘要：We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of a homogeneous good, set reserve prices at their own second-price auctions. Each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit. Buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which, conditional on reserve prices, an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price. In...
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作者：Martinelli, Cesar
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We analyze an election in which voters are uncertain about which of two alternatives is better for them. Voters can acquire some costly information about the alternatives. In agreement with Downs's rational ignorance hypothesis. individual investment in political information declines to zero as the number of voters increases. However. if the marginal cost of information is near zero for nearly irrelevant information, there is a sequence of equilibria such that the election outcome is likely to...
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作者：Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：In perfect foresight dynamics, an action is linearly stable if expectation that people will always choose the action is self-fulfilling. A symmetric game is a PIM game if an opponent's particular action maximizes the incentive of an action, independently of the rest of the players. This class includes supermodular games, games with linear incentives and so forth. We show that, in PIM games, linear stability is equivalent to u-dominance, a generalization of risk-dominance, and that there is no ...
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作者：Brusco, Sandro
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We study social choice functions implementable as perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of incomplete information extensive form games. We restrict attention to two-stage mechanisms in which agents observe a common public signal after the first stage. and fully characterize the set of implementable social choice functions in economic environments. The key condition for implementation, called Extended Bayesian Monotonicity, provides for some kind of preference reversal either at the first or the se...
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作者：Maenhout, Pascal J.
作者单位：INSEAD Business School
摘要：I analyze the optimal intertemporal portfolio problem of an investor who worries about model misspec-ification and insists on robust decision rules when facing a mean-reverting risk premium. The desire for robustness lowers the total equity share, but increases the proportion of the intertemporal hedging demand. I present a methodology for calculation of detection-effor probabilities, which is based on Fourier inversion of the conditional characteristic functions of the Radon-Nikodym derivativ...
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作者：Sun, YN
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：A Fubini extension is formally introduced as a probability space that extends the usual product probability space and retains the Fubini property. Simple measure-theoretic methods are applied to this framework to obtain various versions of the exact law of large numbers and their converses for a continuum of random variables or stochastic processes. A model for a large economy with individual risks is developed; and insurable risks are characterized by essential pairwise independence. The usua...
