Joint production in teams

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Battaglini, Marco
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.005
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 138-167
• 关键词: Contract theory; incentives; moral hazard; teams; theory of the firm

摘要

Consider Holmstrom's moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has an a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output is in-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation generically exists if and only if Sigma(n)(i=1)a(i)/(n - 1) < m. Moreover, under a weak additional condition, the equilibrium implemented by this mechanism is unique in the class of pure strategy Coalition-Proof equilibria. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.