Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Olszewski, Wojciech
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.12.004
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 164-186
• 关键词: cheap-talk games; Equilibrium refinements

摘要

I formalize the notion of equilibrium language, define the relation of having a richer language, and show the existence of equilibria with maximally rich language. I also study the stability of equilibria with respect to inflows of messages that can enrich their language, and provide examples of implausible cheap-talk equilibria, not refined away by the existing refinements, which can be refined away on the grounds of stability properties. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.