-
作者：Kuksov, Dmitri
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：This paper analyzes the effects of buyer search costs and seller private and common knowledge on seller competition. It shows that lack of common knowledge results in the equilibrium price continuously decreasing to the perfectly competitive one as buyer search costs for price decrease from positive for all buyers to zero for all buyers, even if each market agent's uncertainty (in the private knowledge) is small. At the same time, if the uncertainty of each seller about buyer valuations is sma...
-
作者：Sagi, Jacob S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This note explores the implications of a simple and intuitive restriction on reference-dependent preferences assuming the status quo serves as the reference point. The condition imposed potentially rules out situations in which a decision maker has a choice between two prospects, selects one which subsequently becomes the new reference point, and then regrets her initial choice. It is shown that a surprising number of models in a riskless and risky setting violate this behavioral assumption, i...
-
作者：Healy, Paul J.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：In a repeated-interaction public goods economy, incomplete information and dynamic behavior may affect the realized outcomes of mechanisms known to be efficient in a complete information one-shot game. An experimental test of five public goods mechanisms indicates that subjects with private information appear to best respond to recent observations. This provides predictions about which mechanisms will generate convergence to their efficient equilibrium allocations. These predictions match the ...
-
作者：Bisin, A; Horst, U; Özgür, O
作者单位：New York University; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents' choices, which might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study static as well as dynamic infinite horizon economies; we allow for economies with incomplete information, and we consid...
-
作者：Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Bologna
摘要：This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the agent's valuations are positively correlated, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, then it is optimal for the upstream principal to offer the agent full privacy. On the cont...
-
作者：Doepke, M; Townsend, RM
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We develop general recursive methods to solve for optimal contracts in dynamic principal-agent environments with hidden states and hidden actions. Starting from a general mechanism with arbitrary communication, randomization, full history dependence, and without restrictions on preferences or technology, we show that the Optimal contract can be implemented as a recursive direct mechanism. A curse of dimensionality which arises from the interaction of hidden income and hidden actions can be ove...
-
作者：Peng, Shin-Kun; Thisse, Jacques-Francois; Wang, Ping
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; National Taiwan University; Academia Sinica - Taiwan; Washington University (WUSTL); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We examine the interactions between economic integration and employment agglomeration in a neoclassical-growth, middle-product economy. There are two vertically integrated economies, with competitive final good firms operating plants in both regions and monopolistically-competitive intermediate good firms operating each in only one region. Immobile workers are employed with traded middle products to produce the nontraded final good; mobile workers are used with immobile capital to design and p...
-
作者：Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：This paper introduces a notion of p-best response set (p-BR). We build on this notion in order to provide a new set-valued concept: the minimal p-best response set (p-MBR). After proving general existence results of the p-MBR, we show that it characterizes set-valued stability concepts in a dynamic with Poisson revision opportunities borrowed from Matsui and Matsuyama [An approach to equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 65 (1995) 415-434.] Then, we study equilibrium selection. In particular,...
-
作者：Gokan, Y
作者单位：Mie University
摘要：This paper introduces constant government expenditure in Woodford's finance constrained model (J. Econ. Theory, 1986) with capital-labor substitution as presented in Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder (J. Econ. Theory, 1998) and investigates how government expenditure influences local dynamics near multiple steady states, depending upon the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in production. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Bloch, F; Gomes, A
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. We show that when outside options are independent of the actions of other players all Markov perfect equilibrium without coordination failures are efficient, regardless of externalities created by interim actions. Otherwise, in the presence of externalities on outside options...
