Matching with noise and the acceptance curse

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chade, Hector
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.008
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 81-113
• 关键词: Matching; search; adverse selection; Bayesian games

摘要

This paper explores matching with both search and information frictions. Specifically. everyone observes only a noisy signal of the true type of any potential mate. In this context. matching decisions must incorporate not only information about a partner's attribute conveyed by the noisy signal. but also-as in the winner's curse in auction theory-information about a partner's type contained in his or her acceptance decision. We show that there exists an equilibrium exhibiting a stochastic positive assorting of types, generalizing [Becker. J. Polit. Economy 81 (1973) 813-846]. In equilibrium, selection is adverse: being accepted reduces an agent's estimate of a potential partner's type, a phenomenon that we call the acceptance curse effect. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.