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作者：Hatfield, JW
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：In their recent paper, Roth et al. [Pairwise kidney exchange, J. Econ. Theory 125 (2005) 151-188] consider pairwise kidney exchanges, and show within this subset of feasible exchanges that a priority mechanism is strategy-proof. We show that this result can be broadened to allow much more general mechanisms and restrictions on the feasible set of allocations, including allowing three-way exchanges, regional specifications, and others. The key requirement is that the choice mechanism be consist...
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作者：Sveen, T; Weinke, L
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Norges Bank
摘要：Our main result is that dynamic new-Keynesian (DNK) models with firm-specific capital feature a substantial amount of endogenous price stickiness. We use this insight to assess the desirability of alternative interest rate rules, and make the case for combining active monetary policy with interest rate smoothing and/or some responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to real economic activity. The key mechanism behind our results is also useful from a positive point of view: the feature of fir...
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作者：Barbera, S; Dutta, B; Sen, A
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
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作者：Romano, R; Yildrim, H
作者单位：Duke University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents' standard one-period reaction function...
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作者：Meier, M
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：This paper extends the nonexistence result of Heifetz and Samet (Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 260 273). They have shown that there exists no universal knowledge space to which every knowledge space can be mapped in a knowledge-preserving manner. We show that an analogous nonexistence result holds in the more general context of information structures. These structures can be viewed as generalizations of knowledge spaces that describe non-probabilistic beliefs. (c) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights ...
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作者：Saez-Marti, M; Weibull, JW
作者单位：Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：Is discounting of future decision-makers' consumption utilities consistent with pure altruism toward those decision-makers, that is, a concern that they are better off according to their own, likewise forward-looking, preferences? It turns out that the answer is positive for many but not all discount functions used in the economics literature. In particular, hyperbolic discounting of the form used by Phelps and Pollak (Rev. Econ. Studies 35 (1968) 201) and Laibson (Quart. J. Econ. 112 (1997) 4...
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作者：Kawamura, E
作者单位：Universidad de San Andres Argentina
摘要：This paper investigates an extension of the GEI-unawareness framework by Modica et al. (Econ. Theory 12 (1998) 259) to economies with entrepreneurial production. Existence of equilibrium is guaranteed given decreasing returns to scale. Firm's value and investment decision in equilibrium are characterized. An example of commodity innovation shows that the effect of different degrees of awareness on investment decisions depend upon the degree of risk aversion. In the case of log preferences unaw...
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作者：Evans, GW; Guesnerie, R
作者单位：University of Oregon; Universite PSL; College de France
摘要：We examine local strong rationality (LSR) in multivariate models with both forward-lookin expectations and predetermined variables. Given hypothetical common knowledge restrictions that the dynamics will be close to those of a specified minimal state variable solution, we obtain eductive stability conditions for the solution to be LSR. In the saddlepoint stable case the saddle-path solution is LSR provided the model is structurally homogeneous across agents. However, the eductive stability con...
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作者：Esö, P
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We consider an auction setting where the buyers are risk averse with correlated private valuations (CARA preferences, binary types), and characterize the optimal mechanism for a risk-neutral seller. We show that the optimal auction extracts all buyer surplus whenever the correlation is sufficiently strong (greater than 1/3 in absolute value), no matter how risk averse the buyers are. In contrast, we note that a sufficiently risk-averse seller would not use a full rent extracting mechanism for ...
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作者：Fleurbaey, M; Suzumura, K; Tadenuma, K
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Hitotsubashi University; Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour
摘要：Arrow's celebrated theorem of social choice shows that the aggregation of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental weak Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In the standard model of division of commodities, we investigate how much information about indifference surfaces is needed to construct social ordering functions satisfying the weak Pareto p...
