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作者：Andreoni, J; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Experiments have shown that people have a natural taste for cooperation. This paper takes a first step in understanding how formal and informal institutions might be designed to utilize these private tastes to facilitate more efficient economic interactions. We examine a twice-played prisoners' dilemma in which the total of the stakes in the two periods is fixed, but the distribution of these stakes can be varied across periods. We verify experimentally that it is best to start small, reservin...
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作者：Blume, Andreas; Heidhues, Paul
作者单位：University of Bonn; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We study infinitely repeated first-price auctions in which a bidder only learns whether or not he won the object. While repetition of the stage-game equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium in public strategies, with patient bidders there are simple Nash equilibria in private strategies that improve on bid rotation. Sequential rationality is appropriately captured by essentially perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE), which ignores behavior after irrelevant histories. Our main result is the con...
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作者：Branch, WA; Evans, GW
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Oregon
摘要：We introduce the concept of Misspecification Equilibrium to dynamic macroeconomics. Agents choose between a list of misspecified econometric models and base their selection on relative forecast performance. A Misspecification Equilibrium is a stochastic process in which agents forecast optimally given their choices, with forecast model parameters and predictor proportions endogenously determined. Under appropriate conditions, the Misspecification Equilibrium will exhibit Intrinsic Heterogeneit...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Imhof, Lorens A.
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Bonn
摘要：This note characterizes the impact of adding rare stochastic mutations to an imitation dynamic, meaning a process with the properties that absent strategies remain absent, and non-homogeneous states are transient. The resulting system will spend almost all of its time at the absorbing states of the no-mutation process. The work of Freidlin and Wentzell [Random Perturbations of Dynamical Systems, Springer, New York, 1984] and its extensions provide a general algorithm for calculating the limit ...
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作者：Toxvaerd, Flavio
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In most industries, ranging from information systems development to construction, an overwhelming proportion of projects are delayed beyond estimated completion time. This fact constitutes somewhat of a puzzle for existing theory. The present paper studies project delays and optimal contracts under moral hazard in a setting with time to build. Within this setup, project delays are found to be most likely to happen at early stages of development and intimately connected to the degree of commitm...
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作者：Hansen, Lars Peter; Maenhout, Pascal; Rustichini, Aldo; Sargent, Thomas J.; Siniscalchi, Marciano M.
作者单位：New York University; University of Chicago; INSEAD Business School; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Northwestern University
摘要：This article introduces the symposium on model uncertainty and robustness. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Boone, J; Bovenberg, L
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：This paper explores the optimal interaction between the tax system and social assistance in insuring people against the risks of involuntary unemployment and low ability. To that end, we introduce search unemployment in a model of optimal non-linear income taxation. The relationship between welfare benefits and the optimal level of in-work benefits is U-shaped. This explains why in-work benefits are called for both in countries that grant low welfare benefits and countries that provide high we...
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作者：Jordan, J. S.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper introduces a class of coalitional games, called pillage games, as a model of Hobbesian anarchy. Any coalition can pillage, costlessly and with certainty, any less powerful coalition. Power is endogenous, so a pillage game does not have a characteristic function, but pillage provides a domination concept that defines a stable set, which represents an endogenous balance of power. Every stable set contains only finitely many allocations, and can be represented as a farsighted core. Add...
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作者：Hidvegi, Zoltan; Wang, Wenli; Whinston, Andrew B.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Emory University
摘要：Consider an English auction for a single object in which there is an option for a bidder to guarantee a purchase at a seller-specified buy price b at any time. We show that there exist (nu) over bar and (nu) over cap (>= (nu) over bar). such that a bidder purchases at the buy price immediately if his valuation nu is no less than (nu) over cap or (nu) over bar <= nu <= b and at least one other bidder is participating in the auction. If b <= nu < (nu) over bar, he purchases at the buy price once...
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作者：Sethuraman, Jay; Teo, Chung-Piaw; Vohra, Rakesh V.
作者单位：Columbia University; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); National University of Singapore; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper presents two results about preference domain conditions that deepen our understanding of anonymous and monotonic Arrovian social welfare functions (ASWFs). We characterize the class of anonymous and monotonic ASWFs on domains without Condorcet triples. This extends and generalizes an earlier characterization (as Generalized Majority Rules) by Moulin (Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making., Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988) for single-peaked domains. We also describe a doma...
