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作者：Zhao, Rui R.
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：Renegotiation-proof contracts are studied in infinitely repeated principal-agent problem. Contracts satisfying a weaker notion of renegotiation-proofness always exist. The renegotiation-proof value function has a simple characterization: It is the principal's optimal value function when an appropriate lower bound is placed on the agent's expected utility. Sufficient conditions are provided for renegotiation-proof value function in finite horizon to converge to renegotiation-proof value functio...
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作者：Fang, HM; Morris, S
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We consider parametric examples of symmetric two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private Valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent's private valuation. We show that, in such environments, the revenue equivalence between the first and second price auctions (SPAs) breaks down and there is no definite revenue ranking; while the SPA is always efficient allocatively, the first price auction (FPA) may be inefficient; equilibria may fail to exist for th...
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作者：Liski, Matti; Montero, Juan-Pablo
作者单位：Aalto University; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：We consider an infinitely repeated oligopoly in which at each period firms not only serve the spot market by either competing in prices or quantities but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. Contrary to the pro-competitive results of finite-horizon models, we find that the possibility of forward trading allows firms to sustain collusive profits that otherwise would not be possible to achieve. The result holds both for price and quantity competition and follows because (collusi...
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作者：Hansen, Lars Peter; Sargent, Thomas J.; Turmuhambetova, Gauhar; Williams, Noah
作者单位：New York University; University of Chicago; Princeton University
摘要：A decision maker fears that data are generated by a statistical perturbation of an approximating model that is either a controlled diffusion or a controlled measure over continuous functions of time. A perturbation is constrained in terms of its relative entropy. Several different two-player zero-sum games that yield robust decision rules are related to one another, to the max-min expected utility theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior, J. Math. Econ. 18...
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作者：Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo; Rustichini, Aldo
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Turin; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We introduce and aximatize dynamic variational preferences, the dynamic version of the variational preferences we axiomatized in [F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, A. Rustichini, Ambiguity aversion, robustness, and the variational representation of preferences, Mimeo, 2004], which generalize the multiple priors preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior, J. Math. Econ. 18 (1989) 141-153], and include the Multiplier Preferences inspired by robust control an...
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作者：Kesten, O
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：We consider the priority-based allocation problem: there is a set of indivisible objects with multiple supplies (e.g., schools with seats) and a set of agents (e.g., students) with priorities over objects (e.g., proximity of residence area). We study two well-known and competing mechanisms. The agent-optimal stable mechanism (AOSM) allots objects via the deferred acceptance algorithm. The top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) allots objects via Gale's top trading cycles algorithm. We show that t...
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作者：Nirei, M
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; Utah State University
摘要：This paper concerns a propagation mechanism in an economy where many individuals follow a threshold rule and interact with a positive feedback. We derive an asymptotic distribution of the propagation size when the number of the agents tends to infinity. The propagation distribution exhibits a slower convergence to a deterministic value than it would if the agents followed a smooth adjustment policy. This gives rise to significant aggregate fluctuations in a finite lumpy-adjusting economy even ...
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作者：Citanna, A; Polemarchakis, HM; Tirelli, M
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Columbia University; Brown University; Sapienza University Rome
摘要：When the asset market is incomplete, there typically exist taxes on trades in assets that are Pareto improving. This fiscal policy is anonymous, it is fully and correctly anticipated by traders, and it results in ex post Pareto optimal allocations; as such, it improves over previously proposed constrained interventions. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Chattopadhyay, Subir
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Colegio de Mexico
摘要：We considergeneral OLG economies under uncertainty, with short maturity assets and with dividend paying assets of infinite maturity and fiat money, and study the optimality properties of equilibria with a sequence of asset markets that are sequentially complete. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions, in terms of asset prices and dividends, for equilibria to be conditionally Pareto optimal. These results provide a theoretical basis for empirical investigation. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. Al...
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作者：Strausz, R
作者单位：Free University of Berlin
摘要：This paper shows that, contrary to what is generally believed, decreasing concavity of the agent's utility function with respect to the screening variable is not sufficient to ensure that stochastic mechanisms are suboptimal. The paper demonstrates, however, that they are suboptimal whenever the optimal deterministic mechanism exhibits no bunching. This is the case for most applications of the theory and therefore validates the literature's usual focus on deterministic mechanisms. (c) 2005 Els...
