-
作者：Pérez-Castrillo, D; Wettstein, D
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for transferable utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and f...
-
作者：Ali, S. Nageeb M.
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study multilateral bargaining games where agents disagree over their bargaining power. We show that if agents are extremely optimistic, there may be costly delays in an arbitrarily long finite game but if optimism is moderate, all sufficiently long games end in immediate agreement. We show that the game with extreme optimism is highly unstable in the finite-horizon, and we examine the ramifications of this instability on the infinite-horizon problem. Finally, we consider other voting rules,...
-
作者：Kyle, Albert S.; Ou-Yang, Hui; Xiong, Wei
作者单位：Duke University; Princeton University
摘要：We solve a liquidation problem for an agent with preferences consistent with the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky [Econornetrica 47 (1979) 263-291]. We find that the agent is willing to hold a risky project with a relatively inferior Sharpe ratio if the project is currently making losses. and intends to liquidate it when it breaks even. On the other hand. the agent may liquidate a project with a relatively superior Sharpe ratio if its current profits rise or drop to the break-even point...
-
作者：Katta, Akshay-Kumar; Sethuraman, Jay
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：We consider the problem of allocating a set of indivisible objects to agents in a fair and efficient manner. In a recent paper, Bogomolnaia and Moulin consider the case in which all agents have strict preferences, and propose the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism; they define a new notion of efficiency, called ordinal efficiency, and prove that the probabilistic serial mechanism finds an envy-free ordinally efficient assignment. However, the restrictive assumption of strict preferences is cr...
-
作者：Citanna, A.; Polemarchakis, H. M.; Tirelli, M.
作者单位：Columbia University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Brown University; Sapienza University Rome
-
作者：Horst, Ulrich; Scheinkman, Jose A.
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper, we establish existence and uniqueness results for equilibria in systems with an infinite number of agents and with local and global social interactions. We also examine the structure of the equilibrium distribution and derive a Markov property for the equilibrium distribution of a class of spatially homogeneous systems. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Birulin, Oleksii
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：I consider the problem of the efficient provision of a congested (limited capacity) public good in a setting with asymmetric information. I show. in particular. that when the capacity of the good is limited, in a wide class of economies it is possible to Construct an incentive compatible mechanism that always produces the good at the efficient level. balances the budget and satisfies voluntary participation constraints. This result is in contrast with the corresponding impossibiliry result for...
-
作者：Konishi, Hideo; Unver, M. Utku
作者单位：Boston College; Koc University
摘要：It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems. pairwise-stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations. unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair. 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. A credibly group-stable matching is immune to any executable group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability....
-
作者：Miao, JJ
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks. There is a continuum of consumers who face borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The existence of competitive equilibrium is proven and a recursive characterization is established. In particular, it is shown that for any competitive equilibrium, there is a payoff equivalent competitive equ...
-
作者：Grant, Simon; Polak, Ben
作者单位：Yale University; Rice University; Australian National University
摘要：Machina and Schmeidler show that the probabilistic sophistication can be obtained in an Anscombe-Aumann setting without imposing expected utility by maintaining stochastic monotonicity and adding a new axiom loosely analogous to Savage's P4. This analogous axiom, however, is very strong. In this note, we obtain probabilistic sophistication using a weaker (and more natural) analog of Savage's P4. Stochastic monotonicity is sufficient to bridge the gap, where Anscombe and Aumman use independence...
