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作者：Tajika, Tomoya
摘要：Dynamic public good contribution games in the literature allow players to contribute in multiple periods. These games typically have inefficient and, sometimes, (approximately) efficient subgame perfect equilibria. Inefficiency can take the form of either delayed provision or nonprovision of the public good. In contrast, this paper studies a game that differs primarily in that each player can contribute only once. Each player thus chooses the period at which they contribute, and the size of th...
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作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Sharma, Tridib; Vadovic, Radovan
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Carleton University
摘要：Studies of strategic sophistication in experimental normal form games commonly assume that subjects' beliefs are consistent with independent choice. This paper examines whether beliefs are consistent with correlated choice. Players play a sequence of 2 x 2 normal form games with distinct opponents and no feedback. Another set of players, called predictors, report a likelihood ranking over possible outcomes. A substantial proportion of the reported rankings are consistent with the predictors be...
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作者：Gatti, Nicola; Gilli, Mario; Marchesi, Alberto
作者单位：Polytechnic University of Milan; University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：We provide a characterization of quasi perfect equilibria in n-player games, showing that any quasi-perfect equilibrium can be obtained as limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibria of a certain class of perturbed games in sequence form, and any limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibria of these perturbed games is a quasi-perfect equilibrium. We prove that, in games with three or more players, we need trembles defined as rational functions of the perturbation magnitude epsilon, whereas, i...
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作者：Malmendier, Ulrike; Szeidl, Adam
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Central European University
摘要：We show that common market settings tend to amplify rather than reduce the effect of behavioral biases on prices and other market outcomes. We study two common market mechanisms, auctions and fixed-price markets, and establish three results. First, agents with upward-biased valuations have an amplified effect on market outcomes because markets over-select them relative to their population share. Intuitively, markets fish for fools. Second, auctions are often more efficient at fishing than fixe...
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作者：Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard C.
作者单位：Xi'an Jiaotong University; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (i.e., about the quality of a product) to a receiver. Sequential equilibrium and iterated admissibility predict unraveling of information. Iterated admissibility also provides predictions for every finite level of reasoning about rationality. We observe behavior consistent with relatively high levels of reasoning. Iterated admissibility implies that the leve...
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作者：Au, Pak Hung; Kawai, Keiichi
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Talamas, Eduard; Vohra, Rakesh
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Risk compensation can undermine the ability of partially effective vaccines to curb epidemics: Vaccinated agents may optimally choose to engage in more risky interactions and, as a result, may increase everyone's infection probability. We show that-in contrast to the prediction of standard models-things can be worse than that: Free and perfectly safe but only partially effective vaccines can reduce everyone's welfare, and hence fail to satisfy-in a strong sense-the fundamental principle of fir...
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作者：Fiedler, Susann; Hillenbrand, Adrian
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：Framing influences choice. However, little is known about the underlying mechanisms behind framing effects. We study gain-loss framing in binary modified dictator games. Subjects choose the selfish option more often in the loss frame compared to the gain frame. Recording visual fixations with eye-tracking, we find that dictators focus more on their own outcomes when facing losses. This suggests that losses to the own outcome are weighted more than losses to another player. (C) 2020 Elsevier In...
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作者：Herbold, Daniel; Schumacher, Heiner
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; KU Leuven
摘要：This paper studies how workers' on-the-job search influences optimal incentives in organizations. We analyze a principal-agent model in which the agent multitasks between working for the principal and searching for other job opportunities. The agent partly uses on-the-job search to improve his bargaining position within the relationship. We show that the optimal contract may feature both excessive performance bonuses as well as efficiency wages. Both measures reduce the agent's search incentiv...
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Corrao, Roberto; Sanna, Federico
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider multi-stage games with incomplete information, and we analyze strategic reasoning by means of epistemic events within a total state space made of all the profiles of behaviors (paths of play) and possibly incoherent infinite hierarchies of conditional beliefs. Thus, we do not rely on types structures, or similar epistemic models. Subjective rationality is defined by the conjunction of coherence of belief hierarchies, rational planning, and consistency between plan and on-path behav...
