Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• 署名单位: Xi'an Jiaotong University; University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.004
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 329-367
• 关键词: Persuasion games; verifiable information; COMMUNICATION; disclosure; unraveling; Iterated admissibility; Prudent rationalizability; Common strong cautious belief in rationality; Level-k reasoning; experiments; Cognitive ability

摘要

We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (i.e., about the quality of a product) to a receiver. Sequential equilibrium and iterated admissibility predict unraveling of information. Iterated admissibility also provides predictions for every finite level of reasoning about rationality. We observe behavior consistent with relatively high levels of reasoning. Iterated admissibility implies that the level of reasoning required for unraveling is increasing in the number of quality levels. Yet, there is only insignificantly more unraveling in a game with two quality levels than in a game with four quality levels. There is weak evidence for learning. Participants display difficulties in transferring learning from a game with two quality levels to a game with four quality levels. There is a significant but small positive correlation between cognitive abilities in Raven's progressive matrices test and levels of reasoning. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.