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作者：Boosey, Luke; Goerg, Sebastian
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Technical University of Munich; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Max Planck Society
摘要：In a real-effort experiment, we investigate the relationship between reciprocity and the timing of discretionary bonuses in a two-period principal-agent (manager-worker) setting. We vary the timing of the manager's bonus decision in order to examine two main channels, reward and trust, through which discretionary bonuses may operate. Average worker performance improves when bonus decisions are made between the two periods, since both channels are simultaneously active. First-period output sign...
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作者：Bilo, Vittorio; Flammini, Michele; Moscardelli, Luca
作者单位：University of Salento; University of L'Aquila; Gran Sasso Science Institute (GSSI); G d'Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara
摘要：We consider broadcast network design games in undirected networks in which every player is a node wishing to receive communication from a distinguished source node sand the cost of each communication link is equally shared among the downstream receivers according to the Shapley value. We prove that the Price of Stability of such games is constant, thus closing a long-standing open problem raised in Anshelevich etal. (2008). Our result is obtained by means of homogenization, a new technique tha...
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作者：Aina, Chiara; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Gamba, Astrid
作者单位：University of Zurich; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Insubria
摘要：In social dilemmas, choices may depend on belief-dependent motivations enhancing the credibility of promises or threats at odds with personal gain maximization. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the context of the Ultimatum Minigame, assuming that the choice of accepting or rejecting a greedy proposal is affected by a combination of frustration, due to unfulfilled expectations, and inequity aversion. We increase the responder's payoff from the default allocation (the pr...
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作者：Bayona, Anna; Brandts, Jordi; Vives, Xavier
作者单位：Universitat Ramon Llull; Escuela Superior de Administracion y Direccion de Empresas (ESADE); Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：In a laboratory experiment with supply function competition and private information about correlated costs we study whether cost interdependence leads to greater market power in relation to when costs are uncorrelated in the ways predicted by Bayesian supply function equilibrium. We find that with uncorrelated costs observed behavior is close to the theoretical benchmark. However, with interdependent costs and precise private signals, market power does not raise above the case of uncorrelated ...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Teper, Roee
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We study allocation problems when agents negotiate across different agendas. Unlike existing papers on multi-agenda disputes, we consider environments in which resources are constrained and investing (time or effort) in one agenda reduces the ability to invest in other agendas. We introduce a class of cooperative games, referred to as set-valued games (SVG): The value of each coalition is a subset of payoff vectors. Each vector is associated with a distribution of the resources that the coalit...
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作者：Hoyer, B.; Stroh-Maraun, N.
作者单位：University of Paderborn
摘要：We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all s...
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作者：Aramendia, Miguel; Wen, Quan
作者单位：University of Basque Country; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：In obtaining the celebrated folk theorem, not only everyone must value his future sufficiently high, but also everyone must be perceived so by the others. This common perception of players' time preferences must be maintained even after someone deviates. This paper explores the implications of myopic perception in repeated games with perfect monitoring. Under myopic perception, a deviator will not be perceived as a long-run player in the continuation game, which in turn affects the equilibria ...
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作者：Bisin, Alberto; Hyndman, Kyle
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We study procrastination in the context of a field experiment involving students who must exert costly effort to complete certain tasks by a fixed deadline. We document a robust demand for commitment, in the form of self-imposed deadlines. On the other hand, deadlines do not increase completion rates in our experiment Furthermore, while we find that present-bias is widespread in the sample, and present-biased students procrastinate in single task treatments, we find that they successfully mana...
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作者：Ferreira, Joao V.; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Tarroux, Benoit
作者单位：University of Southampton; University of Osaka; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS)
摘要：This paper aims to investigate the motives behind an intrinsic value of decision rights. Based on a series of experimental treatments conducted in France and Japan, we measure how much of such potential value stems from (i) a desire for independence from others, (ii) a desire for power, or (iii) a desire for self-reliance. We find that both Japanese and French subjects attach a significant intrinsic value to hold control. Surprisingly, we find that self-reliance is the only significant motive ...
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作者：Dasaratha, Krishna
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We provide a framework for determining agents' centralities in a broad family of random networks. Current understanding of network centrality is largely restricted to deterministic settings, but practitioners frequently use random network models. Our main theorems show that on large random networks, centrality measures are close to their expected values with high probability. We illustrate the economic consequences via three applications: (1) In network formation models with community structur...
