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作者：Friedman, Evan
摘要：We endogenize the precision parameter lambda of logit quantal response equilibrium (LQRE). In the first stage of an endogenous quantal response equilibrium (EQRE), each player chooses her precision optimally subject to costs, taking as given other players' (secondstage) behavior. In the second stage, the distribution of players' actions is a heterogenous LQRE given the profile of first-stage precision choices. EQRE satisfies a modified version of the regularity axioms, nests LQRE as a limiting...
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作者：Levy, Yehuda John; Veiga, Andre
作者单位：University of Glasgow; Imperial College London
摘要：Frictionless consumer choices and price competition are often associated with competitive markets and vanishing equilibrium profits. We discuss vanishing profits in competitive screening markets like insurance. We assume symmetric firms which exhibit constant returns to scale. Consumer heterogeneity creates the possibility of adverse selection. Firms can offer multiple contracts in equilibrium and (importantly) in any deviation. Nash equilibrium profits vanish if each consumer has a unique opt...
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作者：Sperisen, Benjamin; Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：Amazon.com; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We model stable, non-assortative labor-market matchings. We endogenize how transferable utility is: a matched firm and worker play an infinite-horizon game with one-sided moral hazard. Becker's (1973) result that complementarity yields positively assortative matching fails, because increasing match quality harms dynamic incentives: a firm cannot credibly threaten to fire a worker who is productive even with low effort. Thus, firms may prefer lower-type workers who will exert more effort. We of...
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Bonanno, Giacomo; van der Hoek, Wiebe
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of California System; University of California Davis; University of Liverpool
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作者：Cho, Wonki Jo; Ju, Biung-Ghi
作者单位：Korea University; Seoul National University (SNU); Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：Consider social decision rules identifying two or more groups by aggregating individual opinions on who belong to which group. We search for rules respecting cross-group independence in the aggregation process. This independence axiom or its variants, together with other implicit constraints in the two models by Miller (2008) and Cho and Ju (2017), characterize a restricted family of rules; the only democratic rule in this family is the liberal rule. Our new framework provides a unified perspe...
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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Minardi, Stefania; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University; Yale University
摘要：We present and axiomatize a model combining and generalizing theory-based and analogy-based reasoning in decision under uncertainty. An agent has beliefs over a set of theories describing the data generating process, given by decision weights. She also puts weight on similarity to past cases. When a case is added to her memory and a new problem is encountered, two types of learning take place. First, the decision weight assigned to each theory is multiplied by its conditional probability. Seco...
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作者：Hagiwara, Makoto
作者单位：University of Osaka; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：We identify an error in Theorem 1 of Miyagawa (2002), and then we construct two game forms to achieve his objective. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bernheim, B. Douglas; Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
摘要：We present a theory that rationalizes voters' preferences for decisive leaders. Greater decisiveness entails an inclination to reach decisions more quickly conditional on fixed information. Although speed can be good or bad, agency problems between voters and politicians create preferences among voters for leaders who perceive high costs of delay and have little uncertainty about how to weigh different aspects of the decision problem, and hence who make decisions more rapidly than typical vote...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Smorodinsky, Rann
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：Consider a setting where many individuals forecast the (unknown) state of nature based on signals they receive independently. We refer to the joint distribution over the states and signals as an information structure. An information structure is deemed identifiable if the distribution of forecasts is sufficient to determine the state of nature, even without knowing the underlying information structure. We characterize the set of identifiable information structures and propose a scheme that uni...
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作者：Shneyerov, Artyom; Wong, Adam C. L.
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; Concordia University - Canada; Lingnan University
摘要：We introduce aggregate uncertainty into a Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985)-type dynamic matching and bilateral bargaining model. The market can be either in a high state, where there are more buyers than sellers, or in a low state, where there are more sellers than buyers. Traders do not know the state. They randomly meet each other and bargain by making take-it-or-leave-it offers. The only information transmitted in a meeting is the time a trader spent on the market. There are two kinds of sear...
