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作者：Sanchez-Pages, Santiago
作者单位：University of London; King's College London
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作者：Cao, Cangjian; Li, Sherry Xin; Liu, Tracy Xiao
作者单位：Tsinghua University; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
摘要：We conduct two field experiments to investigate whether and how different forms of monetary gifts influence workers' performance in the workplace. Temporary research assistants are surprised with a monetary gift after completing a pre-announced task and decide whether to work on an additional one. We find in both experiments that the impact of gift type on workers' productivity is contingent on the gift amount. Specifically, for the larger but not the smaller gift amount, a more thoughtful pre...
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作者：Hagenbach, Jeanne; Koessler, Frederic
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We use the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005) to study cheap talk from a sender who does not perfectly understand all the messages available to him. The sender is endowed with a privately known language competence corresponding to the set of messages that he understands. For the messages that he does not understand, the sender has correct but only coarse expectations about the equilibrium response of the receiver. An analogy-based expectation equilibrium is always a Bayesian ...
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作者：Banerjee, Ritwik; Gupta, Nabanita Datta; Villeval, Marie Claire
作者单位：Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Bangalore; Aarhus University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Does feedback on success in a task increase individuals' beliefs about their chance to succeed in a subsequent, unrelated, task? Does feedback on failure have a symmetric effect? Is the distortion of beliefs, possibly due to motivated beliefs, mistakes in updating or the feeling of having a lucky day, heterogeneous across individuals, in particular according to their status in the society? Conducting an artefactual field experiment in India with participants from different castes, we show that...
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作者：Knudson, Mathew
摘要：In the classical spatial model of two candidate competition, an equilibrium exists only if the distribution of voter ideal points is such that every median hyperplane passes through a single policy. The necessity of this condition crucially depends upon both candidates being able to propose any policy in a Euclidean space. We assume that each candidate is affiliated with a party which restricts the policies that its candidate can propose and that voters have Euclidean spatial preferences. We s...
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作者：Stovall, John E.
摘要：We axiomatically characterize the family of equal sacrifice rules for the problem of fair taxation: every agent with positive post-tax income sacrifices the same amount of utility relative to his/her respective pre-tax income. In contrast to the result in Young (1988), our family of rules allows for asymmetric and constrained versions of equal sacrifice. When we add the requirement that an agent's tax burden must not decrease when their income increases, then this is equivalent to assuming tha...
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作者：Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：We analyze undiscounted continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with two armed bandits. The risky arm generates payoffs according to a Levy process with an unknown average payoff per unit of time which nature draws from an arbitrary finite set. Observing all actions and realized payoffs, plus a free background signal, players use Markov strategies with the common posterior belief about the unknown parameter as the state variable. We show that the unique symmetric Markov perfect equi...
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作者：Matyskova, Ludmila; Rogers, Brian; Steiner, Jakub; Sun, Keh-Kuan
作者单位：University of Bonn; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Zurich; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：When observable cues correlate with optimal choices, habit-driven behavior can alleviate cognition costs. We experimentally study the degree of sophistication in habit formation and cue selection. To this end, we compare lab treatments that differ in the information provided to subjects, holding fixed the serial correlation of optimal actions. We find that a particular cue - own past action - affects behavior only in treatments in which this habit is useful. The result suggests that caution is...
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Leonetti, Paolo; Maccheroni, Fabio
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：Two extensive game structures with imperfect information are said to be behaviorally equivalent if they share the same map (up to relabelings) from profiles of structurally reduced strategies to induced terminal paths. We show that this is the case if and only if one can be transformed into the other through a composition of two elementary transformations, commonly known as Interchanging of Simultaneous Moves and Coalescing Moves/Sequential Agent Splitting. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights re...
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作者：Szkup, Michal; Trevino, Isabel
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We study experimentally how changes in the information structure affect behavior in coordination games with incomplete information (global games). We find two systematic departures from the theory: (1) the comparative statics of equilibrium thresholds and signal precision are reversed, and (2) as information becomes very precise subjects' behavior approximates the efficient equilibrium of the game, not the risk dominant one. We hypothesize that sentiments in the perception of strategic uncerta...
