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作者：Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Rainer, Catherine; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Universite de Bretagne Occidentale
摘要：We study the optimal use of information in Markov games with incomplete information on one side and two states. We provide a finite-stage algorithm for calculating the limit value as the gap between stages goes to 0, and an optimal strategy for the informed player in the limiting game in continuous time. This limiting strategy induces an c-optimal strategy for the informed player, provided the gap between stages is small. Our results demonstrate when the informed player should use her informat...
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作者：Vasquez, Jorge; Weretka, Marek
作者单位：Smith College; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：In this paper, we examine strategic settings in which players have interdependent preferences. Players' utility functions depend not only on the strategy profile being played, but also on the realized utilities of other players. Thus, players' realized utilities are interdependent, capturing the psychological phenomena of affective empathy and emotional contagion. We offer a solution concept for these empathetic games and show that the set of equilibria is non-empty and, generically, finite. M...
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作者：Alston, Max
作者单位：Australian National University; Reserve Bank of Australia
摘要：This article extends the model of matching with incomplete information presented by Liu et al. (2014) by imposing exogenous restrictions on the beliefs of firms. The main result is that generically, there is always some game that contradicts the imposition of exogenous beliefs. This result complements Liu et al. (2014) by showing that their focus on stability for all reasonable beliefs is appropriate. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
作者单位：University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We develop a graphical, non-analytical version of the two-person beauty contest game to study the developmental trajectory of instinctive behavior and learning from kindergarten to adulthood. These are captured by observing behavior when the game is played in two consecutive trials. We find that equilibrium behavior in the first trial increases significantly between 5 and 10 years of age (from 17.9% to 61.4%) and stabilizes afterwards. Children of all ages learn to play the equilibrium, especi...
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作者：Negrelli, Sara
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：Recent empirical studies suggest that, during times of unexpected innovation, agents heterogeneously update their beliefs about an asset fundamental value and are uncertain of other agents' beliefs about it. In this paper I show that, when there is uncertainty over the market sentiment - defined as other investors' beliefs about an asset fundamental value - market manipulation can act through a previously unconsidered channel, by misleading agents' learning on the market sentiment. This novel ...
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作者：Aziz, Haris; Chan, Hau; Lee, Barton E.; Parkes, David C.
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO); University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln; Harvard University
摘要：We initiate the study of the capacity constrained facility location problem from a mechanism design perspective. In the capacity constrained setting, the facility can serve only a subset of the population, assumed to be the k-closest with respect to agents' true locations (this can be justified as the essentially unique equilibrium outcome of a first-come-first game induced by the facility location). The main result is a complete characterization of dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DIC)...
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作者：Chen, Yin; Dang, Chuangyin
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：As a strict refinement of Nash equilibrium, the concept of perfect equilibrium was formulated and extensively studied in the literature. To determine perfect equilibrium, this paper extends the logistic version of quantal response equilibrium (logit QRE) to a perturbed game. As a result of this extension, a smooth path is constructed for determining perfect equilibrium. The path starts from an arbitrary totally mixed strategy profile and leads to a perfect equilibrium. Numerical examples show ...
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作者：Donna, Javier D.; Schenone, Pablo; Veramendi, Gregory F.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Fordham University; University of Munich
摘要：This article uses networks to study price dispersion in seller-buyer markets where buyers with unit demand interact with multiple, but not all, sellers; and buyers and sellers compete on prices after they meet. The central finding of this article is that price dispersion is determined by the structure of the network. First, for any given network we characterize the pairwise stable matchings and the prices that support them. Second, we characterize the set of all graphs where price dispersion i...
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作者：Ging-Jehli, Nadja R.; Schneider, Florian H.; Weber, Roberto A.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Zurich
摘要：We experimentally study whether individuals adopt negative beliefs about others' intentions to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study compares the beliefs held by players with such an incentive to the beliefs of neutral observers and finds no evidence that individuals engage in strategic cynicism. This contrasts with other recent evidence demonstrating that people hold less positive beliefs about others when doing so allows them to act more self-interestedly. We reconcile the discrepancy, ...
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作者：Petri, Henrik
作者单位：University of Bath
摘要：We characterize lexicographic conditional probability systems (LCPSs). Our aim is to address an issue left open in an important contribution by Blume et al. (1991a). They provide a characterization of LCPSs, but one of their axioms quite explicitly imposes disjointness of the supports in an LCPS. The main new axiom is robustness, which is a weak continuity requirement on preferences. It requires preferences between acts x and y to be robust to (unchanged by) small perturbations in payoffs x(om...
