Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Au, Pak Hung; Kawai, Keiichi
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.002
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 56-78
• 关键词: Information transmission; Bayesian persuasion; multiple senders

摘要

We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.