Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tajika, Tomoya
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.011
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 228-239
• 关键词: Dynamic contribution game; Contribute once; EFFICIENCY

摘要

Dynamic public good contribution games in the literature allow players to contribute in multiple periods. These games typically have inefficient and, sometimes, (approximately) efficient subgame perfect equilibria. Inefficiency can take the form of either delayed provision or nonprovision of the public good. In contrast, this paper studies a game that differs primarily in that each player can contribute only once. Each player thus chooses the period at which they contribute, and the size of the contribution. The main result is that if the number of periods is finite but larger than the number of players, then every subgame perfect equilibrium in which each player's contribution amount is strictly less than that player's valuation for the good is efficient: the public good is provided without delay. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.