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作者：Guarino, Pierfrancesco
作者单位：University of Klagenfurt
摘要：We introduce a novel framework to describe dynamic interactive reasoning in presence of unawareness. We extend the notion of conditional probability systems for this setting and we perform the construction of the corresponding canonical hierarchical structure, that is, the structure that contains all coherent infinite hierarchies of beliefs in presence of unawareness and conditioning events, which is an extension of the one constructed in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999a). Relying on the exis...
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作者：He, Simin; Wu, Jiabin
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Oregon
摘要：This study experimentally examines the role of a compromise option in a repeated battleof-the-sexes game. In a random matching environment, we find that compromise serves as an effective focal point and facilitates coordination, but fails to improve efficiency. However, in a fixed-partnership environment, compromise deters subjects from learning to play alternation, which is a more efficient, but arguably more complex strategy. As a result, compromise hurts efficiency by allowing subjects to c...
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作者：Abraham, Ittai; Athey, Susan; Babaioff, Moshe; Grubb, Michael D.
作者单位：VMware, Inc.; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
摘要：We study how ex ante information asymmetries affect revenue in common-value second price auctions, motivated by online advertising auctions where cookies inform individual advertisers about advertising opportunities. We distinguish information structures in which cookies identify lemons (low-value impressions) from those in which cookies identify peaches (high-value impressions). As this setting features multiple Nash equilibria, we introduce a new refinement, tremble robust equilibrium (TRE) ...
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作者：Ciccarone, Giuseppe; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni; Papa, Stefano
作者单位：Sapienza University Rome; Universita della Campania Vanvitelli
摘要：We aim to empirically investigate the rationale of in-group-favoritism. As potential explanations, we concentrate on intrinsic preferences for own-group members and motivations related to individuals caring about the beliefs of others (founded on guilt aversion). We also consider their intersection. Our evidence shows that in-group-favoritism cannot be accounted for by changes in expectations. This suggests that preferences per se are the most powerful explanation of social identity. (c) 2020 ...
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作者：Feldman, Michal; Fu, Hu; Gravin, Nick; Lucier, Brendan
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Microsoft
摘要：A simultaneous item auction is a simple procedure for allocating multiple indivisible goods to a set of bidders. In a simultaneous auction, every bidder submits bids on all items simultaneously. The allocation and prices are then resolved for each item separately, based solely on the bids submitted on that item. Such procedures are similar to auctions used in practice (e.g. eBay) but are not incentive compatible. We study the efficiency of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) outcomes of simultaneo...
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作者：Catonini, Emiliano; De Vito, Nicodemo
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：We provide epistemic foundations for permissibility (Brandenburger, 1992), a strategic-form solution concept for finite games which coincides with the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure, i.e., the elimination of all weakly dominated strategies, followed by the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We show that permissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of cautious rationality and common weak belief of cautious rationality in the canonical, universal type structure for lex...
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作者：Leung, Benson Tsz Kin
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper studies the information processing behavior of a decision maker (DM) who can only process a subset of all information he receives: before taking an action, the DM receives sequentially a number of signals and decides whether to process or ignore each of them as it is received. The model generates an information processing behavior consistent with that documented in the psychological literature: first, the DM chooses to process signals that are strong; second, his processing strategy...
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作者：Sun, Ching-jen
作者单位：Deakin University
摘要：We study the structure of Nash equilibria in generic n x n games. A game is said to have a sandwich structure in Nash equilibria if there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium inside every collection of pure strategy Nash equilibria. A sufficient condition, which solely relies on the ordinal information of the game, is given for a generic n x n game to have a sandwich structure in Nash equilibria. We provide a lower bound on the number of Nash equilibria and determine the stability of each equi...
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作者：Hillas, John; Samet, Dov
作者单位：University of Auckland; Tel Aviv University
摘要：There are four types of dominance depending on whether domination is strict or weak and whether the dominating strategy is pure or mixed. Letting d vary over these four types of dominance, we say that a player is d-dominance rational when she does not play a strategy that is d-dominated relative to what she knows. For weak dominance by a mixed strategy, Stalnaker (1994) introduced a process of iterative maximal elimination of certain profiles that we call here flaws. We define here, analogousl...
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作者：Solan, Eilon; Solan, Omri N.; Solan, Ron
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study the implementation of a jointly controlled lottery when the coins that are used by the players are exogenously given. We apply this result to show that every quitting game in which at least two players have at least two continue actions has an undiscounted epsilon-equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
