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作者：Guo, Shiqi; Liang, Pinghan; Xiao, Erte
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Sun Yat Sen University; Monash University
摘要：We conducted a field experiment in a typical Chinese prison to examine the in-group bias of groups with a stigmatized identity. Inmates were given the opportunity to work for a charity. We found evidence of both pro-sociality and in-group favoritism among inmates. In particular, inmates increased their efforts when their output contributed to a charity and worked even harder when the beneficiary of their efforts have a prisoner identity. However, inmates who have been in prisons for a longer p...
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作者：Zhang, Qiaoxi
作者单位：Universidad de Chile
摘要：This paper studies how agents choose to be vague in their proposals in a delegation environment. Two agents compete for the approval of a decision maker to implement a multidimensional action. Based on their knowledge of the consequences of actions, agents propose future actions but can be vague about any dimension. The decision maker, uncertain about the consequences of actions, chooses one agent to act. I show that vagueness on the dimension where one stands closer to the decision maker than...
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作者：Doni, Nicola; Menicucci, Domenico
作者单位：University of Florence
摘要：Gentry, Li, Lu (2017) (GLL henceforth) study an auction model with endogenous entry in which, before the entry decision, each bidder observes a private signal; a higher signal implies a better distribution for the bidder's valuation. GLL claim that the optimal reserve price is greater than the seller's value for the object on sale and that the optimal entry fee is positive. We prove that these claims are incorrect: The seller may want to subsidize entry to stimulate competition in the auction ...
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作者：Margaria, Chiara
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：This paper examines the interplay of informational and payoff externalities in a two-player irreversible investment game. Each player learns about the quality of his project by observing a private signal and the action of his opponent. I characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium in a timing game that features a second-mover advantage, allowing for arbitrary correlation in project qualities. Despite private learning, the game reduces to a stochastic war of attrition. In contrast to the case...
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作者：Bonifacio, Agustin G.; Masso, Jordi
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that do main and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Coffman, Lucas; Niehaus, Paul
作者单位：Boston College; University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：While economic theories of persuasion emphasize the role of self-interest, others emphasize other-regard. To study these pathways, we introduce a simple experimental framework where sellers use free-form conversation to convince buyers to raise their valuations for objects. We find sellers more frequently target buyers' self-interest, and changes in selfinterest explain more variation in persuasion overall. Additionally, sellers' gains along one pathway come at a considerable cost along the ot...
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作者：Arigapudi, Srinivas
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We consider a model of stochastic evolution under the probit choice rule. In the small noise double limit, where first the noise level in agents' decisions is taken to zero, and then the population size to infinity, escape from and transitions between equilibria can be described in terms of solutions to continuous optimal control problems. We use results from optimal control theory to solve the exit cost problem. This is used to determine the most likely exit paths from the initial basin of at...
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作者：Arnold, Michael; Zhang, Lan
作者单位：University of Delaware; Beijing Normal University; Beijing Normal University Zhuhai
摘要：We characterize equilibria of a market in which firms with asymmetric loyal customer bases can pay a fixed cost to advertise prices through an information clearinghouse to compete for shoppers. We find that the magnitude of the advertising cost and differences in the sizes of the firms' loyal market shares are critical in determining which firms compete for shoppers in equilibrium. If the advertising cost is sufficiently low, then only the two firms with the smallest loyal market shares advert...
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作者：Bykhovskaya, Anna
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：The paper investigates conditions which guarantee the existence of a stable outcome in a school matching in the presence of peer effects. We consider an economy where students are characterized by their type and schools are characterized by their quality and capacity. We divide students and schools into groups, so that going to a school outside of one's group is associated with additional costs or prohibited. A student receives utility from a school per se and from one's classmates. We find th...
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作者：Kakhbod, Ali; Song, Fei
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper studies how information design, via public disclosure of past trade details, affects price discovery in a dynamic market. We model that an informed forward-looking buyer sequentially trades with a series of uninformed sellers (hedgers) with heterogenous hedging motives. We discover that sellers' price discovery over the underlying hidden fundamentals is crucially affected by what they can observe about past trade details. Specifically, (i) the availability of past trade details, par...
