-
作者：Gneezy, Uri; Saccardo, Silvia; Serra-Garcia, Marta; van Veldhuizen, Roel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Amsterdam; Carnegie Mellon University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Lund University
摘要：Expert advice is often biased in ways that benefit the advisor. We demonstrate how self-deception helps advisors be biased while preserving their self-image as ethical and identify limits to advisors' ability to self-deceive. In experiments where advisors recommend one of two investments to a client and receive a commission that depends on their recommendation, we vary the timing at which advisors learn about their own incentives. When advisors learn about their incentives before evaluating th...
-
作者：Masiliunas, Aidas; Nax, Heinrich H.
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We use a unified framework to model rent-seeking (Tullock) contests and games of strategic complements or substitutes. In each game, we compare an 'abstract' frame with an 'economic' frame. We find more competitive behavior under economic than under abstract framing in the contest and in the game of strategic complements, but not in the game of strategic substitutes. Variation in the strategic nature of the game interacts differently with preferences than with beliefs, allowing us to identify ...
-
作者：Cheung, Yun Kuen; Cole, Richard; Devanur, Nikhil R.
作者单位：Singapore University of Technology & Design; New York University; Microsoft
摘要：We identify a class of economies for which tatonnement is equivalent to gradient descent. This is the class of economies for which there is a convex potential function whose gradient is always equal to the negative of the excess demand. Among other consequences, we show that a discrete version of tatonnement converges to the equilibrium for the following economies of complementary goods. i. Fisher economies in which all buyers have complementary CES utilities, with a linear rate of convergence...
-
作者：Sadler, Evan
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：I study learning about an innovation with costly information acquisition and knowledge sharing through a network. Agents situated in an arbitrary graph follow a myopic belief update rule. The network structure and initial beliefs jointly determine long-run adoption behavior. Networks that share information effectively converge on a consensus more quickly but are prone to errors. Consequently, dense or centralized networks have more volatile outcomes, and efforts to seed adoption should focus o...
-
作者：Castillo, Geoffrey
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：The attraction effect violates choice consistency, one of the central assumptions of economics. I present a risky choice experiment to test it and disentangle some of its explanations. I find the attraction effect, but in a smaller magnitude than previously thought. I uncover a 'range effect' that shows that people weight more attributes whose range increases. I also show that the aggregate results hide considerable heterogeneity between subjects. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Sun, Xiang; Zeng, Yishu
作者单位：Wuhan University; Wuhan University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper studies pure strategy perfect and proper equilibria for games with non-atomic measure spaces of players and infinitely many actions. A richness condition (nowhere equivalence) on the measure space of players is shown to be both necessary and sufficient for the existence of such equilibria. The limit admissibility of perfect and proper equilibria is also proved. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Danz, David
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This study investigates a source of comparative overconfidence, or overplacement, which occurs when people overestimate themselves relative to others. We present a simple application of information projection (Madarasz, 2012) to show that hindsight bias can lead to overplacement and excessive willingness to compete. We run an experiment in which subjects choose between a competitive tournament and piece-rate compensation after observing some of their competitors' past performance. We exogenous...
-
作者：Sundararajan, Mukund; Yan, Qiqi
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：Most literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing for a risk-neutral seller. We consider risk-averse sellers in a setting of multi-unit auctions with unit-demand bidders. We seek utility-oblivious mechanisms that do not know about the seller's utility function, while still achieving constant factor approximations to the expected utility of the optimal mechanism tailored to the utility function. Our main results are natural hedging-based mechanisms that give such utility-oblivious appro...
-
作者：Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele
作者单位：University of Turku; University of Glasgow
摘要：We study the relationship between the two-agent implementation problem and the concept of interim efficiency of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) in Bayesian environments with private values and independent types. We present a general property, called closure under interim utility equivalence, and show it is sufficient for the implementation of social choice functions. This condition, when combined with another property, called interim inseparability, is also sufficient for the implementation of es...
-
作者：Navarro, Noemi; Veszteg, Robert F.
作者单位：Universite de Bordeaux; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Waseda University
摘要：We report experimental results and test axiomatic models of unstructured bargaining by checking the empirical relevance of the underlying axioms. Our data support strong efficiency, symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives and monotonicity, and reject scale invariance. Individual rationality and midpoint domination are violated by a significant fraction of agreements that implement equal division in highly unequal circumstances. Two well-known bargaining solutions that satisfy the con...
