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作者：Andina-Diaz, Ascension; Garcia-Martinez, Jose A.
作者单位：Universidad de Malaga; Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche
摘要：This paper proposes a new argument to explain why media firms silence information and why this behavior may vary across firms and market structures. We build on the literature of career concerns and consider firms that seek to maximize their reputation for high quality. Crucial to our results is the idea that media firms' reporting strategies affect the probability that consumers learn the state of the world. We show that reputational concerns introduce an incentive for firms to withhold scoop...
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作者：Ewerhart, Christian; Valkanova, Kremena
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Zurich
摘要：This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/tau, regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-person zero-sum games with bilinear payoff functions do not possess the continuous-time fictitious-play property. As extensions, we consider networks in which each bilateral game i...
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作者：Kwiek, Maksymilian
作者单位：University of Southampton
摘要：A model of communication with two features is presented: inattentive receivers, who are heterogeneous in their inattention, and the intermediaries, whose preferences are not aligned with each other or with the preferences of the initial sender. The sender faces a dilemma how to shape her message to maneuver the intermediaries into telling the final receivers what she considers important. A sincere communication policy and competition between the intermediaries are optimal if three conditions h...
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作者：Michaeli, Moti
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：The tendency of people to divide into groups and to show in-group bias - preferential treatment for insiders - is widely observed. This paper shows that it arises naturally when people incur a moral cost when defecting against cooperators, provided that this cost is concave in the number of such defections. If some people are asocial, i.e. insusceptible to the moral cost, then, under incomplete information, free-riding and cooperation can coexist within groups. Costly signaling of sociality en...
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作者：Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Mu'alem, Ahuva
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We study implementability and revenue equivalence for selling mechanisms in a model where a seller has multiple items to allocate, and a buyer has private valuations and private budgets. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for selling mechanisms to be incentive compatible and ex-post budget feasible for the buyer and derive the revenue equivalence principle in the presence of private budgets. Our conditions are based on a novel network approach that exploits the difference between u...
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作者：Mackenzie, Andrew
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We consider probabilistic versions of obviously strategy-proof implementation (Li, 2017) for stochastic rules, and provide an algorithm involving several ideas from the literature (Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2018; Pycia and Troyan, 2016; Bade and Gonczarowski, 2017) that converts any such implementation into a randomized round table implementation, where the administrator randomly selects a game form in which agents take turns making public announcements about their private information (Theorem...
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作者：Li, Chen; Turmunkh, Uyanga; Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; IESEG School of Management
摘要：This paper examines the difference between strategic ambiguity as in game theory and ambiguity arising in individual decisions. We identify a new, non-strategic component underlying all strategic ambiguities, called social ambiguity. We recommend controlling for it to better identify strategic causes. Thus, we shed new light on Bohnet and Zeckhauser's betrayal aversion in the trust game. We first show theoretically that, contrary to preceding claims in the literature, ambiguity attitudes can p...
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作者：Song, Yangbo; Zhang, Jiahua
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; South China University of Technology
摘要：We study observational learning among agents with coordination motives. On a discrete time line, communities of agents receive private information about an uncertain state, observe some predecessors' actions, and then take their own action. An agent's payoff is both state-dependent and increasing in the number of her peers taking the same action as hers. We find that connectivity between observations is the key determinant of the equilibrium pattern of information aggregation. When observation...
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作者：Noussair, Charles N.; Seres, Gyula
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Arizona; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：This paper examines the effect of collusion on allocative efficiency in a second-price sealed-bid auction, in which bidders' valuations have both private and common value components. We present a theoretical model which shows that explicit collusion improves average efficiency. Furthermore, a reduction in common value signal variance increases the efficiency of allocations when a cartel is present. We test for the presence of these patterns in a laboratory experiment. Subjects can choose wheth...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; He, Kevin
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); California Institute of Technology; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period. Inexperienced agents are uncertain about the prevailing distribution of opponents' play, but believe that opponents never choose conditionally dominated strategies. Agents engage in active learning and update beliefs based on personal observations. Payoff information...
