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作者：Renault, Jerome; Ziliotto, Bruno
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：We introduce the model of hidden stochastic games, which are stochastic games where players observe past actions and public signals on the current state. The natural state variable for these games is the common belief over the current state of the stochastic game. In this setup, we present an example in which the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as the discount factor goes to 1, does not exist. Although the equilibrium payoff sets have full dimension, there is no converging selection of equil...
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作者：Dizdar, Deniz; Kovac, Eugen
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; University of Duisburg Essen
摘要：We provide a simple proof of strong duality for the linear persuasion problem. The duality is established in Dworczak and Martini (2019), under slightly stronger assumptions, using techniques from the literature on optimization with stochastic dominance constraints and several approximation arguments. We provide a short, alternative proof that is based on a direct argument to show the existence of optimal price functions, and on switching the roles of the primal and the dual to show that there...
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作者：Leister, C. Matthew
作者单位：Monash University
摘要：This paper studies information acquisition and use in network games. The network structure incorporates both strategic complements (positive links) and substitutes (negative links). An information-use game played on a correlation-adjusted network is derived. Equilibrium inefficiencies in both acquisition and use of information are characterized. Inefficient bunching obtains in information acquisition, where the spread in equilibrium signal precisions is below that prescribed by the planner. Th...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie M.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Duke University
摘要：Asset markets-institutions that reallocate goods among agents with heterogeneous endowments, demands, and valuations-abound in the real world but have received little attention in mechanism and market design. Assuming constant marginal, private values and known endowments and maximum demands, we provide a detail-free, dominant-strategy asset market mechanism that allocates efficiently or close to efficiently, respects traders' individual rationality constraints ex post, and never runs a defici...
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作者：Ensthaler, Ludwig; Huck, Steffen; Leutgeb, Johannes
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：From the regulation of sports to lawmaking in parliament, in many situations one group of people (agents) make decisions that affect the payoffs of others (principals) who may offer action-contingent transfers in order to sway the agents' decisions. Prat and Rustichini (2003) characterize pure-strategy equilibria of such Games Played Through Agents. Specifically, they predict the equilibrium outcome in pure strategies to be efficient. We test the theory in a series of experimental treatments w...
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作者：Ferrali, Romain
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：How does the structure of an organization affect corruption? This paper analyzes a model that views organizations as networks on which coalitions of corrupt accomplices may form. This network approach to corruption provides new insights into the problem: (i) corruption will arise in enclaves, i.e. coalitions that minimize joint exposure to witnesses, (ii) making the organization more connected may increase corruption, and (iii) corruption will involve larger coalitions under better monitoring....
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作者：Auerbach, Jan U.; Fonseca, Miguel A.
作者单位：University of Exeter; Universidade do Minho; University of Exeter
摘要：To address delay and backlog at civil courts, we propose a procedural rule that we refer to as preordered service to replace sequential service of low-profile cases for breach of contract. Courts preannounce a list that uses uniquely identifying information to rank potential low-profile contracts, like a combination of contracting parties' taxpayer numbers. They use this list to schedule initial hearings of filed low-profile contract cases in that order. In theory, unlike sequential service, p...
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作者：Garcia-Pola, Bernardo
摘要：Regret minimization and level -k reasoning have been proposed as alternative models for rationalizing non-equilibrium behavior in games. We provide a theoretical and experimental analysis of the relationship between these two models, a relationship that has been neglected by economists. Both theories predict the same behavior in a surprisingly large number of experimentally tested games. We identify conditions under which this happens and use them to design a series of games to separate minima...
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作者：Busetto, Francesca; Codognato, Giulio; Julien, Ludovic
作者单位：University of Udine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we show that, when atoms have Leontievian utility functions, any Cournot-Nash allocation is a Walras allocation and, consequently, it is Pareto optimal. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Burkett, Justin; Woodward, Kyle
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：Uniform price auctions frequently admit equilibria which raise zero seller revenue. We show that when demand is sufficiently strong - when market supply is more than covered by any bidder's opponents - the introduction of a reserve price improves revenue not only by directly increasing the market clearing price, but also by eliminating low revenue equilibria in which the market clearing price is almost always equal to the reserve. The condition on demand is sharp, and when it is not satisfied ...
