Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Busetto, Francesca; Codognato, Giulio; Julien, Ludovic
• 署名单位: University of Udine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.004
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 318-327
• 关键词: Cournot-Nash equilibrium; Walras equilibrium; Leontievian preferences

摘要

We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we show that, when atoms have Leontievian utility functions, any Cournot-Nash allocation is a Walras allocation and, consequently, it is Pareto optimal. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.