Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garcia-Pola, Bernardo
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.013
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 82-104
• 关键词: Regret minimization; Level-kmodel; experiments; Initial responses; mixture-of-types models

摘要

Regret minimization and level -k reasoning have been proposed as alternative models for rationalizing non-equilibrium behavior in games. We provide a theoretical and experimental analysis of the relationship between these two models, a relationship that has been neglected by economists. Both theories predict the same behavior in a surprisingly large number of experimentally tested games. We identify conditions under which this happens and use them to design a series of games to separate minimax regret from level 1. The experimental test of these games and data from Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) reveal that no one systematically minimizes regret, casting doubt on minimax regret as a relevant explanation for behavior in strategic situations. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.