Games and Economic Behavior

最新文章

• Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist AI翻译
  作者：Correia-da-Silva, Joao
  作者单位：Universidade do Porto; Universidade do Porto
  摘要：A durable goods monopolist proposes selling mechanisms in two periods, being unable to commit in the first period on the mechanism to propose in the second. Trade is anonymous and resale is not possible. Although buyers have a continuum of possible valuations, the optimal first-period mechanism is a menu with at most two possibilities: a high price guaranteeing delivery and a low price subject to rationing. This characterization is robust to the arrival of additional buyers in the second perio...
• Regime change games with an active defender AI翻译
  作者：Jann, Ole; Schottmueller, Christoph
  作者单位：Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; University of Cologne; Tilburg University
  摘要：We analyze a regime change game in which an active defender can invest in costly, unobservable defenses. We show that if there are sufficiently many potential attackers, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which the defender chooses to have almost no defenses and attacks almost never occur. This provides a new perspective on coordination problems and the necessity of refinements in regime change games. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
• An experiment on network density and sequential learning AI翻译
  作者：Dasaratha, Krishna; He, Kevin
  作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
  摘要：We conduct a sequential social-learning experiment where subjects each guess a hidden state based on private signals and the guesses of a subset of their predecessors. A network determines the observable predecessors, and we compare subjects' accuracy on sparse and dense networks. Accuracy gains from social learning are twice as large on sparse networks compared to dense networks. Models of naive inference where agents ignore correlation between observations predict this comparative static in ...
• Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments AI翻译
  作者：d'Adda, Giovanna; Dufwenberg, Martin; Passarelli, Francesco; Tabellini, Guido
  作者单位：University of Milan; University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Turin; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
  摘要：We propose a simple theory of social norms that models the distinct influence on behavior of personal values, normative expectations and empirical expectations. The first and second moments of the distribution of normative expectations affect the strength of social norms' pull on behavior. We test the empirical predictions of the model through an experiment based on a variant of the dictator game. Consistent with the theory, we find that normative expectations influence generosity and that hig...
• Bayesian games with intentions AI翻译
  作者：Bjorndahl, Adam; Halpern, Joseph Y.; Pass, Rafael
  作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Cornell University
  摘要：We define Bayesian games with intentions by introducing a distinction between intended and actual actions, generalizing both Bayesian games and (static) psychological games Geanakoplos et al. (1989). We propose a new solution concept for this framework and prove that Nash equilibria in static psychological games correspond to a special class of equilibria as defined in our setting. We also show how the actual/intended divide can be used to implement the distinction between real outcomes and re...
• Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations AI翻译
  作者：Bloch, Francis; van den Nouweland, Anne
  作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Oregon
  摘要：This paper analyzes farsighted stability when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying the two properties of justifiability and maximality and define stable alternatives as unique stationary points of the expectation function of some agent. We characterize stable alternatives in one-to-one matching models and voting models, and show that the relaxation of the hypothesis of common expectations greatly expands the set of states...
• Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs AI翻译
  作者：Fukuda, Satoshi
  作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
  摘要：This paper formalizes common belief among players with no underlying assumption on their individual beliefs. Especially, players may not be logically omniscient, i.e., they may not believe logical consequences of their beliefs. The key idea is to use a novel concept of a common basis: it is an event such that, whenever it is true, every player believes its logical consequences. The common belief in an event obtains when a common basis implies the mutual belief in that event. If players' belief...
• Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions AI翻译
  作者：Wittwer, Milena
  作者单位：Stanford University
  摘要：I develop a framework to study common situations, in which substitute goods are sold in separate, good-specific multi-unit (pay-as-bid) auctions. I characterize bidding behavior and investigate auction design features that could increase revenues. The setting I develop gives rise to an essentially unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which bidders shade their bids more strongly when goods are close substitutes. To increase revenues, the seller can offer total supply quantities that are (stocha...
• Assortative multisided assignment games: The extreme core points AI翻译
  作者：Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz, F.; Rafels, Carlos; Ybern, Neus
  作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona; Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
  摘要：We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martinez-de-Albeniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core point...
• Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games AI翻译
  作者：Mohlin, Erik; Ostling, Robert; Wang, Joseph Tao-yi
  作者单位：Lund University; Stockholm School of Economics; National Taiwan University
  摘要：We study a simple model of similarity-based global cumulative imitation in symmetric games with large and ordered strategy sets and a salient winning player. We show that the learning model explains behavior well in both field and laboratory data from one such winner-takes-all game: the lowest unique positive integer game in which the player that chose the lowest number not chosen by anyone else wins a fixed prize. We corroborate this finding in three other winner-takes-all games and discuss u...