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作者：Kennes, John; le Maire, Daniel; Roelsgaard, Sebastian T.
作者单位：Aarhus University; University of Copenhagen; Princeton University; Aarhus University
摘要：This paper offers expected revenue and pricing equivalence results for canonical matching models. The equivalence of these models is centered on the assumption that there are large numbers of buyers and sellers, and the contact decisions of buyers to sellers are made independently. Therefore, the distribution of buyers to sellers is approximated by the Poisson distribution. The list of canonical matching models includes the models developed by Burdett and Judd (1983), Shimer (2005), and McAfee...
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作者：Hwang, Sung-Ha; Rey-Bellet, Luc
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：We introduce new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. Two games are strategically equivalent if, for every player, the payoff differences between two strategies (holding other players' strategies fixed) are identical. A zero-sum equivalent game is a game that is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game; a zero-sum equivalent potential game is a potential game that is str...
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作者：Mookherjee, Dilip; Motta, Alberto; Tsumagari, Masatoshi
作者单位：Boston University; University of New South Wales Sydney; Keio University
摘要：In designing a contract with an agent privately informed about its cost, should a principal consult an expert who has already received a partially informative signal of the agent's cost? The expert has a prior relationship with the agent, facilitating (weak) ex ante collusion which coordinates their participation and reporting decisions with accompanying side-payments. While delegating contracting with the agent to the expert is never profitable, we show that consulting the expert is typically...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Cantala, David; Gibaja, Damian
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; Colegio de Mexico; Universidad Popular Autonoma del Estado de Puebla
摘要：We analyze a three-sided matching market where institutions own objects and individuals belong to institutions. Institutions pool their objects to enlarge the choice set of individuals. For any institution, the number of individuals who receive an object must be equal to the number of objects initially owned. Under this distributional constraint, individually rational and fair assignments may fail to exist. However, when the number of individuals is sufficiently large, fair assignments exist a...
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作者：Brutt, Katharina; Schram, Arthur; Sonnemans, Joep
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; European University Institute
摘要：We study the effects of varying individual pivotality and endogenous group entry on the selfishness of group decisions. Selfish choices by groups are often linked to the possibility of diffusing responsibility; the moral costs of these decisions appear smaller when individual pivotality is reduced. Our experimental design explores unanimity voting under distinct defaults to identify this effect. In exogenously formed groups we find evidence of responsibility diffusion, but this diminishes with...
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作者：Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; Melendez-Jimenez, Miguel A.
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Trieste; University of Essex; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Universidad de Malaga
摘要：This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap-talk information. We find that the level of trade in these markets is very small and eventually vanishes. Sellers provide low-quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff. This contributes to the low demand in the market for information. Moreover, we observe the same very low level of activity in the market for information when sellers face no conflict of interest and the noise in the...
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作者：Troyan, Peter; Delacretaz, David; Kloosterman, Andrew
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Oxford
摘要：We propose a solution to the conflict between fairness and efficiency in one-sided matching markets. A matching is essentially stable if any priority-based claim initiates a chain of reassignments that results in the initial claimant losing the object. We show that an essentially stable and Pareto efficient matching always exists and that Kesten's (2010) EADA mechanism always selects one while other common Pareto efficient mechanisms do not. Additionally, we show that there exists a student-pe...
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作者：Bao, Renjie; Li, Sanxi; Yu, Jun
作者单位：Renmin University of China; Renmin University of China; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Balmaceda (2016) shows that, under certain conditions, specialization can dominate multitasking when tasks are complementary, because specialization allows for a more flexible implementation of effort profiles than multitasking does. We show that this result is vacuously true, and multitasking always dominates specialization with task complementarity. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Karakas, Leyla D.; Mitra, Devashish
作者单位：Syracuse University
摘要：We provide a model of electoral competition between an establishment and an outsider candidate in which each candidate has a fixed characteristic that voters care about and promises a policy of redistribution from skilled to unskilled voters. The voters perceive the establishment candidate to be more beholden to special interests and therefore more likely to renege on a promise of a large policy change in favor of the status-quo after the election. The equilibrium features policy divergence an...
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作者：Marzilli Ericson, Keith M.
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：Dynamic defaults for recurring purchases determine what happens to consumers enrolled in a product or service who take no action at a decision point. Consumers may face automatic renewal, automatic switching, or non-purchase defaults. Privately optimal dynamic defaults depend on the contributions of adjustment costs versus costless opt out frictions: both produce inertia under renewal defaults, but differ under non-renewal defaults. Defaults have equilibrium effects on pricing by changing the ...
