Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Burkett, Justin; Woodward, Kyle
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.011
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 297-306
• 关键词: Auctions; Multi-unit auctions; pricing

摘要

Uniform price auctions frequently admit equilibria which raise zero seller revenue. We show that when demand is sufficiently strong - when market supply is more than covered by any bidder's opponents - the introduction of a reserve price improves revenue not only by directly increasing the market clearing price, but also by eliminating low revenue equilibria in which the market clearing price is almost always equal to the reserve. The condition on demand is sharp, and when it is not satisfied there exist equilibria in which the market clearing price almost always equals the reserve. Our results therefore fully characterize the existence of low revenue equilibria in terms of bidder demand at a given reserve price. This sharp characterization extends directly to the case of stochastic supply, and low revenue equilibria also fail to exist when supply is stochastic and elastic. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.