Preordered service in contract enforcement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Auerbach, Jan U.; Fonseca, Miguel A.
• 署名单位: University of Exeter; Universidade do Minho; University of Exeter
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.007
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 130-149
• 关键词: Judicial system; COURTS; Judiciary performance; Legal procedure; Civil cases; Caseload; Contract enforcement; Population of investment games; unraveling; experiments

摘要

To address delay and backlog at civil courts, we propose a procedural rule that we refer to as preordered service to replace sequential service of low-profile cases for breach of contract. Courts preannounce a list that uses uniquely identifying information to rank potential low-profile contracts, like a combination of contracting parties' taxpayer numbers. They use this list to schedule initial hearings of filed low-profile contract cases in that order. In theory, unlike sequential service, preordered service ensures efficiency in a population of investment games through unraveling. Results from a laboratory experiment suggest that it may substantially reduce court caseloads. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.