Information acquisition and welfare in network games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Leister, C. Matthew
• 署名单位: Monash University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.006
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 453-475
• 关键词: Centrality; endogenous information; Network games; welfare

摘要

This paper studies information acquisition and use in network games. The network structure incorporates both strategic complements (positive links) and substitutes (negative links). An information-use game played on a correlation-adjusted network is derived. Equilibrium inefficiencies in both acquisition and use of information are characterized. Inefficient bunching obtains in information acquisition, where the spread in equilibrium signal precisions is below that prescribed by the planner. The welfare analysis offers a policy intervention publicizing players' information investments. The more linked a player is, positively or negatively, the more strongly they respond to the policy to influence others' information acquisition and use. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.