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作者：Hu, Gaoji; Li, Jiangtao; Tang, Rui
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Singapore Management University; Princeton University
摘要：We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings in two-sided matching markets with one-sided preferences. Our main result connects the revealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure of the set of stable matchings, and tests the rationalizability of a data set by analyzing the joins and meets of matchings. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Mitzkewitz, Michael; Neugebauer, Tibor
作者单位：University of Luxembourg; University of Luxembourg
摘要：We model economic transactions as prisoner's dilemma games with an outside option played by randomly matched pairs drawn from an anonymous population. In this environment, two intermediary institutions are studied who punish their customers for cheating. One institution does so by enforcing payment of a fine, while the other inflicts a bad reputation on the customer. By voluntarily becoming a customer of an intermediary institution, a player can signal her pre-commitment to honest action to th...
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作者：DeAngelo, Gregory; Gee, Laura K.
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Tufts University
摘要：Punishments are meant to deter bad acts, but we commonly only punish those we catch. At some point in time, a society chooses how to catch bad acts. We explore the effect of how we catch bad acts on public good provision. We contrast monitoring done by peers (e.g., a neighbor reporting illegal dumping) to that done by an organized group (e.g., the police patrolling for crime). We find that when either type of monitoring is exogenously imposed, both peer and group monitoring lead to similar lev...
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作者：Goel, Gagan; Mirrokni, Vahab; Leme, Renato Paes
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：Auctions for perishable goods such as Internet ad inventory need to make real-time allocation and pricing decisions as the supply of the good arrives in an online manner, without knowing the entire supply in advance. In this work, we consider a multi-unit model where buyers have global budget constraints, and the supply arrives in an online manner. Our main contribution is to show that for this setting there is an individuallyrational, incentive-compatible and Pareto-optimal auction that alloc...
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作者：Yang, Yi-You
作者单位：Aletheia University
摘要：We study choice functions which arise in the context of matching with contracts. A choice function is rationalizable if it coincides with a choice function induced by a preference relation over sets of contracts. We show that a choice function is rationalizable if and only if it satisfies the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP), and give an algorithm for verifying the rationalizability of a given choice function. Consequently, we prove that every path independent choice function is rati...
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作者：Catonini, Emiliano
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：Strong-Delta-Rationalizability introduces first-order belief restrictions in the analysis of forward induction reasoning. Without actual restrictions, it coincides with Strong Rationalizability (Battigalli, 2003; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003). These solution concepts are based on the notion of strong belief (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002). The non-monotonicity of strong belief implies that the predictions of Strong-Delta-Rationalizability can be inconsistent with Strong Rationalizabilit...
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作者：Dur, Umut Mert; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：North Carolina State University
摘要：No strategy-proof mechanism Pareto dominates the student-proposing Deferred Acceptance mechanism (hereafter DA). However, it is unknown if a mechanism can Pareto dominate DA in equilibrium. We demonstrate a surprising result: a market designer can do better by learning less about students' preferences when making a school assignment. Specifically, we demonstrate that running DA but limiting students to only two applications always has an equilibrium (in weakly undominated, pure strategies) tha...
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作者：Hill, Brian
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：The famous conflict between dynamic consistency and ambiguity purportedly undermines these models' normative credibility, and challenges their use in economic applications. Dynamic consistency concerns preferences over contingent plans: so what counts are the contingencies the decision maker envisages - and plans for - rather than independently fixed contingencies, as implicitly assumed in standard formalisations. An appropriate formulation of dynamic consistency resolves the aforementioned co...
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作者：Grech, Philip D.; Nax, Heinrich H.
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of Zurich
摘要：Experimental implementations of dictator games are found to differ in terms of their underlying strategic incentives. We explore this discovery in two separate directions. Theoretically, assuming identical other-regarding preferences, we show that the two most widely used protocols can generate strongly contrasting rational-choice predictions, from which different interpretations of dictator giving arise. Experimentally, a tailor-made experiment reveals significant differences between the two ...
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作者：Zhang, Jun
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University
摘要：In the house allocation model, the literature (Bade, 2016; Zhang, 2019) have proven impossibility theorems regarding the compatibility of efficiency, fairness, and group non-manipulability if agents' preferences are unrestricted. Since in many applications not all preferences are possible, this paper examines to what extent these theorems still hold on restricted preference domains. We find that these theorems still hold unless the domains are restricted to have a special tier structure. We pr...
