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作者：Lu, Jingfeng; Lu, Yuanzhu; Wang, Zhewei; Zhou, Lixue
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Science & Technology Beijing; Shandong University
摘要：This paper compares two procedures for allocating a sequence of fixed prizes in multistage nested Tullock contests. In a winner-leave (loser-leave) procedure, in each stage, the prizes of the stage are allocated to winners (losers) according to their ranks, and prizes in early stages are higher (lower) than those in later stages. Players who obtain prizes leave the contest and the others proceed to the next stage of competition. For both procedures, it is effort-maximizing to allocate one priz...
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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Universitat de Girona
摘要：We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of pri...
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作者：Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price haggling and show that bargaining can become a trap, where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer's valuation). This arises when one party is impatient about capturing zero surplus (e.g., Rubinstein's example of fxed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with costless unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally remov...
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作者：Perez-Castrillo, David; Sun, Chaoran
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Shanghai University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We define the proportional ordinal Shapley (the POSh) solution, an ordinal concept for pure exchange economies in the spirit of the Shapley value. Our construction is inspired by Hart and Mas-Colell's (1989) characterization of the Shapley value with the aid of a potential function. The POSh exists and is unique and essentially single-valued for a fairly general class of economies. It satisfies individual rationality, anonymity, and properties similar to the null-player and null-player out pro...
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作者：Hillenbrand, Adrian; Verrina, Eugenio
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2
摘要：We study how positive narratives (stories in favor of a prosocial action) and negative narratives (stories in favor of a selfish action) influence prosocial behavior in a series of lab and online experiments with more than 1500 subjects. We find that, both positive and negative narratives are effective at changing how actions are perceived. However, while positive narratives increase prosocial behavior, negative narratives do not move aggregate behavior and - if anything - lead to slightly mor...
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作者：Dvijotham, Krishnamurthy; Rabani, Yuval; Schulman, Leonard J.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study out-of-equilibrium price dynamics in Fisher markets. We develop a general framework in which sellers have (a) a set of atomic price update rules (APU), which are simple responses to a price vector; (b) a belief-formation procedure that simulates actions of other sellers (themselves using the APU) to some finite horizon in the future. Sellers use an APU to respond to a price vector they generate with the belief formation procedure. The framework allows sellers to have inconsistent and ...
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作者：Papadimitriou, Christos; Pierrakos, George; Psomas, Alexandros; Rubinstein, Aviad
作者单位：Columbia University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Stanford University
摘要：We introduce a simple dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer offers two items in two consecutive stages to a single buyer. The buyer's joint distribution of valuations for the two items is known, and the buyer knows the valuation for the current item, but not for the one in the future. The designer seeks to maximize expected revenue, and the mechanism must be deterministic, truthful, and ex-post individually rational. We show that finding the optimum deterministic mechanism in ...
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作者：Lipnowski, Elliot; Mathevet, Laurent; Wei, Dong
作者单位：Columbia University; European University Institute; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some. We study optimal information provision in a tractable model with quadratic payoffs where full disclosure is not optimal. We characterize incentive-compatible information policies, that is, those to which the agent willingly pays full attention. In a leading e...
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作者：Yamaguchi, Yohei
作者单位：Waseda University
摘要：In a political competition, political parties run their campaign communications to attract voters' attention to issues in which the parties have an advantage. Investigating how parties' issue selection strategy affects issue salience is crucial, considering the media outlets' behavior, as most voters receive political communication from parties through media reporting. In this study, I develop an issue selection model that incorporates the profit-maximization behavior of media outlets. First, ...
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Serena, Marco
作者单位：Tulane University; Max Planck Society
摘要：We consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante symmetric players. An effort-maximizing designer commits to a vector of three biases (advantages or disadvantages), one per match. When the designer can choose victory -dependent biases (i.e., biases that depend on the record of matches won by players), the effort-maximizing biases eliminate the momentum effect, leaving players equally likely to win each match and the overall contest. Instead, when the designer can only choose vic...
