On identifying subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes for timing games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Steg, Jan-Henrik
• 署名单位: University of Graz
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.012
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 74-78
• 关键词: Timing games; subgame-perfect equilibrium; Second-mover advantage

摘要

In Smirnov and Wait (2021), an iterative method is devised to identify subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of timing games. This note shows by simple examples that the identification is in fact neither necessary nor sufficient. The main issue is that the method does not fully reflect the requirements of subgame perfection, so there is a conceptual and not just a technical problem. (C) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.