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作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Gonczarowski, Yannai A.; Nisan, Noam; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Consider a monopolist selling n items to an additive buyer whose item values are drawn from independent distributions F-1, F-2, ..., F-n possibly having unbounded support. Unlike in the single-item case, it is well known that the revenue-optimal selling mechanism (a pricing scheme) may be complex, sometimes requiring a continuum of menu entries. Also known is that simple mechanisms with a bounded number of menu entries can extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. Nonetheless, whethe...
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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
作者单位：University of Southern California; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study from a developmental viewpoint the ability to perform contingent reasoning and the cognitive abilities that facilitate optimal behavior. Individuals from 11 to 17 years old participate in a simplified version of the two-value, deterministic acquire-a company adverse selection game (Charness and Levin, 2009; Martinez-Marquina et al., 2019). We find that even our youngest subjects understand well the basic principles of contingent reasoning (offer the reservation price of one of the se...
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作者：Guha, Brishti; Chowdhury, Prabal Roy
作者单位：Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We examine affirmative action, class-based (CAA), as well as identity-based (IAA), in an economy with income heterogeneity and diverse identity groups. With CAA there exists a unique colour-blind equilibrium where assignment to skilled jobs depends on class, but not on identity. Whereas with IAA, there is a unique equilibrium that exhibits patronisation, i.e. black workers of both income classes face lower standards relative to their white counterparts. Comparing CAA with IAA, poor white worke...
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作者：Boucekkine, Raouf; Fabbri, Giorgio; Federico, Salvatore; Gozzi, Fausto
作者单位：Universite de Rennes; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); INRAE; Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; University of Genoa; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：We characterize the shape of spatial externalities in a continuous time and space differential game with transboundary pollution. We posit a realistic spatiotemporal law of motion for pollution (diffusion and advection), and tackle spatiotemporal non-cooperative (and cooperative) differential games. Precisely, we consider a circle partitioned into several states where a local authority decides autonomously about its investment, production and depollution strategies over time knowing that inves...
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作者：Harless, Patrick; Phan, William
作者单位：University of Arizona; North Carolina State University
摘要：Equity motivates randomization, but often comes at the cost of efficiency. We study the tradeoff within the strategy-proof family of priority rules. Although randomization over all priority orders is incompatible with efficiency, we characterize the maximal subsets of priority for which randomization preserves efficiency: free-agent and adjacent-three families. Introducing equity measures for asymmetric rules, we show that mixtures within these subfamilies admit probabilistic guarantees that p...
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作者：Cho, Wonki Jo
作者单位：Korea University
摘要：We study a model where evaluation consists of multiple components of different nature and (cardinal) performances in all components are aggregated into a summary index between 0 and 1. We propose what we call the normalizer-based aggregation rules and characterize them by individual separability, monotonicity, anonymity, and component independence. Each member in this family is distinguished by three parameters: (i) a profile of weights that determines the relative importance of each component...
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作者：Meng, Dawen; Sun, Lei; Tian, Guoqiang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting & Finance; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Hubei University of Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper studies a mechanism design problem with networked agents and stochastically evolving private information. In contrast to the canonical mechanism design theory focusing only on information asymmetry, we also pay attention to the topology of social network among agents. We find that the standard first-order approach for mechanism design is invalid in dynamic environment. As a remedy, a novel ironing technique is proposed, which produces a perfectly sorting allocation. Based on the opt...
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作者：Tobias, Aron
作者单位：Syracuse University
摘要：A generalized game is a strategic situation in which agents' behavior restricts their opponents' available action choices, giving rise to interdependencies in terms of what strategy profiles remain mutually feasible. This paper proposes a novel example of a simple jointly convex generalized game in which the well-known convexity, compactness, continuity, and concavity assumptions are satisfied, but no Nash equilibrium exists. The essence of this contribution lies in answering a question left o...
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作者：Rodivilov, Alexander
作者单位：Stevens Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper examines the benefit of monitoring an agent who works on an innovative project of uncertain quality. The agent is asked to experiment to uncover the quality of the project. The agent has the ability to manipulate the principal's beliefs about the project quality because the effort of the agent may not be observable (moral hazard), and success may not be publicly observed (hidden information). The optimal timing of monitoring trades off the benefit of alleviating the moral hazard pro...
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作者：Awaya, Yu; Do, Jihwan
作者单位：University of Rochester; Wuhan University
摘要：We study a moral hazard problem for a firm with multiple workers where the firm cannot discriminate among workers' wages-equal-pay constraint - and evaluate workers' performances only through peers-subjective peer evaluation. More precisely, each worker privately chooses an effort level, which generates private signals received by his peers. The firm solicits peer evaluations, which are not verifiable. The wage must be equal across workers ex post. We show that the firm can still provide incen...
