Signal-jamming in the frequency domain

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Taub, B.
• 署名单位: University of Glasgow
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.006
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 896-930
• 关键词: Dynamic games; Signal jamming; Strategic information; Frequency-domain methods

摘要

I examine strategic behavior for a duopoly in a noisy environment. Firms attempt to learn the value of the rival's privately observed demand shocks via a noisy signal of price , at the same time firms attempt to obfuscate that signal by producing excess output on the publicly observable signals, that is, they signal jam.In a dynamic setting firms also distort the intertemporal structure of output keyed to the publicly observable demand shock process in order to disguise their private shocks. The net outcome is to radically increase the persistence of elements of output over their full-information value, but also to reduce the persistence of price over its full-information value; this latter effect is inconspicuousness.