Competitive information disclosure in random search markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: He, Wei; Li, Jiangtao
• 署名单位: Chinese University of Hong Kong; Singapore Management University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.004
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 132-153
• 关键词: Information design; multiple senders; search frictions

摘要

We analyze the role of competition in information provision in random search markets. Multiple symmetric senders compete for the receiver's investment by disclosing information about their respective project qualities, and the receiver conducts random search to learn about the qualities of the projects. We show that in any symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium, each sender chooses a strategy with the lowest possible reservation value. There is no active search, and the receiver does not benefit from the competition of the senders.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.