Stability of alliance networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cai, Xinyue; Kimya, Mert
• 署名单位: Rice University; University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.008
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 401-409
• 关键词: Farsighted stability; networks; coalitional games; Farsighted stable set; POWER; alliances

摘要

We investigate whether peace can be achieved through the formation of an alliance network, where an alliance designates the possibility of coordinating joint offensive and defensive military action. If players are myopic then no alliance network is peaceful in the absence of trade (see Jackson and Nei (2015)). In contrast, we show that if players anticipate that an initial act of aggression can result in further conflict then peaceful alliance networks can be constructed by dividing the players into two components in such a way that inter-component conflict is avoided through the fear of ensuing intra-component conflict, and intra-component conflict is avoided through the fear of ensuing inter-component conflict.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.