An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; Yamada, Takashi
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Cote d'Azur; University of Osaka; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Yamaguchi University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 88-104
• 关键词: Nash program; bargaining procedures; Shapley value; experiments

摘要

We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand based Winter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective power, provided that the grand coalition is formed. & COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.