Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berkemer, Rainer; Starke, Jens; Kawamoto, Atsushi
• 署名单位: University of Rostock; Toyota Central R&D Labs Inc
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.008
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 339-356
• 关键词: Evolutionary game theory; learning; Social dilemma; nonlinear dynamics; Selection processes; Best experienced payoff dynamics

摘要

The traveler's dilemma is characterized by a strict Nash equilibrium that is Paretoinefficient. Even though a coordinated choice of more efficient options would be preferred by both players, any individual deviation from Nash behavior will induce a lower payoff. Yet experimental behavior reported in the literature demonstrates that deviations from Nash behavior toward Pareto-better outcomes are typical. An application of the sampling dynamics to this dilemma further justifies the non-Nash behavior. Due to the fact, that the sampling dynamics is not payoff-monotonic, even dominated strategies can survive the selection process. It is shown that for a generalized traveler's dilemma an interior equilibrium attracts almost all trajectories, given that there are sufficiently many options. The limit for infinitely many options is derived. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.