Alternative characterizations of three bargaining solutions for nonconvex problems
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Xu, Yongsheng; Yoshihara, Naoki
署名单位：
University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Hitotsubashi University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.003
发表日期：
2006
页码：
86-92
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Our characterizing axioms are various extensions of Nash's original axioms. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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