The nucleolus of balanced simple flow networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Potters, J; Reijnierse, H; Biswas, A
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Indian Statistical Institute
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.008
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 205-225
• 关键词: Cooperative game theory; Nucleolus; core; balancedness; flow network; potential

摘要

This paper gives an algorithm for the nucleolus of simple flow games with directed and undirected, private as well as public arcs, under the condition that the flow game has a nonempty core. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.