Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Sandholm, Tuomas; Suri, Subhash
署名单位：
Carnegie Mellon University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.001
发表日期：
2006
页码：
321-330
关键词：
摘要：
In most real-world (electronic) marketplaces, there are additional considerations besides maximizing immediate economic value. We present a sound way of taking such considerations into account via side constraints and non-price attributes, and show that side constraints (such as budget, limit on the number of winners, and exclusive-or) have a significant impact on the complexity of market clearing. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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